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Abstract
We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with
data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Ac-
ceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring
truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptoti-
cally) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her
favorite school/college among those she is qualified for ex post. Having illustrated
the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and
demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when
each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.
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Centralized mechanisms are common in the placement of students to public schools
and colleges. Over the past decade, the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) has
become the leading mechanism to match students with schools at all education levels and
is now used in many education systems around the world, including Amsterdam, Boston,
Hungary, New York, Paris, and Taiwan.
One of the reasons for the growing popularity of DA is its strategy-proofness (Abdul-
kadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). When applying for admission, students are asked to sub-
mit rank-order lists (ROLs) of schools, and it is in their best interest to rank schools
truthfully. The mechanism therefore releases students and their parents from strategic
considerations. As a consequence, it provides education authorities “with more credible
data about school choices, or parent ‘demand’ for particular schools,” as argued by the
former Boston Public Schools superintendent Thomas Payzant when recommending DA
in 2005. Indeed, such rank-ordered data contain rich information on student preferences
over schools, and are increasingly used in the empirical literature.
Due to the strategy-proofness of DA, one may be tempted to assume that the sub-
mitted ROLs of schools reveal students’ true preferences. However, a clarification of
the setting is necessary, as its institutional specifics determine the plausibility of this
truth-telling assumption. One is the “lottery” setting, in which an education author-
ity prioritizes students into a limited number of groups for admissions and breaks ties
with a post-application lottery (Pathak, 2011). Another is the “strict-priority” setting in
which students are strictly ranked by some priority index, e.g., a standardized test score,
which is known to students when they submit their ROL. Distinguishing between the
two settings highlights the boundary of strategy-proofness. Consider a student who likes
a highly selective school but has a low test score. In the strict-priority setting, this stu-
dent may “skip the impossible” and choose not to apply to this school, as she rationally
expects a zero admission probability. Such behavior implies that not all students have
strong incentives to rank all schools truthfully in their ROLs. On the contrary, the same
student may choose to apply to the highly selective school in the lottery setting, because
of the positive admission probability.
In contrast to the lottery setting, the strict-priority setting remains largely unexplored
in the empirical literature on school choice and college admissions.1 Based on theoretical
1There are a few exceptions, Ajayi (2017), Akyol and Krishna (2017), and Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles
and Wilson (2014), which we discuss in the literature review.
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Table 1: Centralized School Choice and College Admissions based on the Deferred
Acceptance Mechanism with Strict Priority Indices: Examples
Country/city Assignment mechanism Choice restrictions Sources
Panel A. Secondary Education
Boston (selective schools)a Student-proposing DA Unrestricted [1]
Chicago (selective schools)a DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices [2]
NYC (selective schools)a DA (Serial dictatorship)c Unrestricted [1]
Finland School-proposing DA Up to 5 choices [3]
Ghana DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices [4]
Paris School-proposing DA Up to 8 choices [5]
Romania DA (Serial dictatorship)c Unrestricted [6]
Singapore DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 6 choices [7]
Turkey DA (Serial dictatorship)c Up to 12 choices [8] [9]
Panel B. Higher Education
Australia (Victoria) College-proposing DA Up to 12 choices [10]
Chile College-proposing DA Up to 8 choices [11]
Hungary Student-proposing DA Unrestrictedb [12]
Ireland College-proposing DA Up to 10 choices [13]
Norway College-proposing DA Up to 15 choices [14]
Spain Student-proposing DA Region-specific [15] [16]
Taiwan College-proposing DA Up to 100 choices [17]
Tunisia College-proposing DA Up to 10 choices [18] [19]
Turkey College-proposing DA Up to 24 choices [20] [21]
Notes: a For exam schools in Boston, selective enrollment high schools in Chicago, and specialized high schools in NYC,
strict priority indices are used in the admission. In contrast, admissions to other schools often do not use strict priority
indices. b In Hungary, students may apply for any number of programs but they are charged a fee (of approximately
10 euros) for every program after the third application. c In all of the countries/cities listed in this table, students’
priorities are based on various combinations of grades, entrance/exit exams, and other criteria (aptitude tests, interviews,
etc.). When priority indices are not school-specific, i.e., schools/universities rank students in the same way, DA, whether
student-proposing or school/college-proposing, is equivalent to serial dictatorship, under which students, in the order of
their priority indices, are allowed to choose among the remaining schools or universities.
Sources: [1] Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist and Pathak (2014); [2] Pathak and So¨nmez (2013); [3] Salonen (2014); [4] Ajayi (2017);
[5] Hiller and Tercieux (2014); [6] Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013); [7] Teo, Sethuraman and Tan (2001); [8] Balinski and
So¨nmez (1999); [9] Akyol and Krishna (2017); [10] VTAC (2016a; 2016b); [11] Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2013);
[12] Biro´ (2011); [13] Chen (2012); [14] Kirkebøen, Leuven and Mogstad (2016); [15] Mora and Romero-Medina (2001);
[16] Calsamiglia, Haeringer and Klijn (2010); [17] UAC (2014); [18] Luflade and Zaiem (2017); [19] Tunisian Ministry of
Higher Education and Scientific Research (2017); [20] Balinski and So¨nmez (1999); [21] Saygin (2013).
investigations of student incentive and behavior, our paper aims to provide empirical
approaches to estimating student preferences with data from school choice and college
admissions in the strict-priority setting. These approaches can potentially be applied in
many real-life cases. Specifically, Table 1 provides a list of examples, which include school
choice in Finland, Paris, and Turkey (Panel A) as well as college admissions in Chile,
Norway, and Taiwan (Panel B).
The first contribution of this paper is to clarify the implications of the truth-telling
assumption, which requires that students always report true preferences. Given the flour-
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ishing empirical literature on the lottery setting (Pathak and Shi, 2014; Abdulkadirog˘lu,
Agarwal and Pathak, Forthcoming), it would seem natural to extend the truth-telling-
based approaches used in that literature to the strict-priority setting. Unfortunately,
strategy-proofness only implies that truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy, which
leads to the issue of multiple equilibria because some students may achieve the same
payoff by opting for non-truth-telling strategies—as illustrated by the “skipping the im-
possible” example above. Making truth-telling even less likely, many applications of DA
restrict the length of submittable ROLs, which destroys strategy-proofness (Haeringer
and Klijn, 2009; Calsamiglia et al., 2010).
These arguments are formalized in a theoretical model. Deviating from the theoretical
literature, we introduce an application cost that students have to pay when submitting
ROLs, and the model therefore has the common real-life applications of DA as special
cases. Conditional on both preferences and priorities being private information, we show
that for truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, two conditions are needed: no ap-
plication cost and large uncertainty in admission outcomes. Neither is easily satisfied in
our setting. Even without constraints on the length of submittable ROLs, students may
find it costly to rank a long list of schools. As students know their own priority indices,
uncertainty in admission outcomes can also be limited.
Going beyond truth-telling, our paper’s second contribution is to propose a set of novel
empirical approaches that are theoretically founded. We consider a weaker assumption
implied by truth-telling: stability, or justified-envy-freeness, of the matching outcome
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), which means that every student is matched with
her favorite school out of all the feasible ones. A school is feasible for a student if its
ex post cutoff is lower than the student’s priority index. These cutoffs are well-defined
and often observable to the researcher: given an outcome, each school’s cutoff is the
lowest priority index of the students accepted there. Conditional on the cutoffs, stability
therefore defines a discrete choice model with personalized choice sets.
We show that stability is a plausible assumption, as there exists an equilibrium out-
come of the game that is asymptotically stable under certain conditions. When school
capacities and the number of students increase proportionally while the number of schools
is fixed, the fraction of students not matched with their favorite feasible school tends to
zero. Although stability, as an ex post optimality condition, is not guaranteed in such
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an incomplete-information game if the market size is arbitrary, we provide numerical ev-
idence suggesting that typical real-life markets are sufficiently large for this assumption
to be almost exactly satisfied.
Based on the theoretical results, we propose a menu of approaches for preference esti-
mation. We start by formalizing the truth-telling assumption under which one can apply
rank-ordered models on submitted ROLs to estimate student preferences. In practice,
students rarely rank all available schools, and, therefore, the truth-telling assumption
often implicitly imposes the exogeneity of the length of a submitted ROL.2
Stability leads to a discrete choice model with personalized choice sets, so the identifi-
cation and estimation in the discrete-choice literature can be applied (e.g., Matzkin, 1993).
Moreover, an important advantage of this approach is that it enables estimation with data
on matching outcomes only, without requiring information on students’ submitted ROLs.
We also provide a solution if neither truth-telling nor stability is satisfied: as long
as students do not play dominated strategies, the submitted ROLs reveal true partial
preference orders of schools (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009),3 which allows us to derive prob-
ability bounds for one school being preferred to another. The corresponding moment
inequalities can be used for inference by applying the related methods (for a survey, see
Tamer, 2010). When stability is satisfied and identifies student preferences, these inequal-
ities provide over-identifying information that can improve estimation efficiency (Moon
and Schorfheide, 2009).
To guide the choice between these identifying assumptions, we consider several statis-
tical tests. Truth-telling, leading to more restrictions than stability, can be tested against
stability using a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 1978) or a test of over-identifying restric-
tions (Hansen, 1982). Moreover, stability can be tested against undominated strategies:
if the outcome is unstable, the stability restrictions are incompatible with the moment
inequalities implied by undominated strategies, allowing us to use tests such as Bugni,
Canay and Shi (2015).
Our third contribution is to evaluate the performance of the different approaches
based on simulated and real-life data. Having illustrated the main theoretical results
with Monte Carlo simulations, we apply the empirical approaches to school choice data
2As a result, we emphasize the difference between strict and weak truth-telling. The former assumes
that all students rank all schools truthfully, while the latter requires students to rank their most-preferred
schools truthfully and allows them to omit the least-preferred schools.
3A ROL is a true partial preference order if the listed schools are ranked according to true preferences.
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from Paris. The data contain 1,590 middle school students applying for admission to 11
academic-track high schools in the Southern District of Paris through a version of the DA
mechanism. Schools rank students by their academic grades but give priority to those
from low-income families. Our findings are more consistent with stability than truth-
telling. Reduced-form evidence on students’ ranking behavior suggests that some students
may have omitted the most selective schools from their lists because of low admission
probabilities. Our proposed statistical tests reject truth-telling in favor of stability but
fail to reject stability against undominated strategies. The truth-telling-based estimator
tends to underestimate students’ valuation of popular schools, and is outperformed by
the stability-based estimator when it comes to predicting matching outcomes and student
preferences.
To highlight the differences between the proposed approaches and their underlying
behavioral assumptions, we summarize our theoretical results and describe the nesting
structure of the assumptions in Section 5. We also emphasize the key features of school
choice and college admissions in practice that can help us to choose the most appropriate
empirical approach to preference estimation.
Other Related Literature. Since the seminal paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003), the theoretical investigation of student behavior and matching properties un-
der the DA mechanism has been extensive. Specifically, large markets are commonly
used in theoretical studies to explore the properties of mechanisms (see the survey by
Kojima, 2015). Closely related to our study is Azevedo and Leshno (2016), who show
the asymptotics of the cutoffs of stable matchings. Our paper extends their results to
outcomes of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereas they implicitly assume that students
are always truth-telling. Our results on asymptotic stability in equilibrium are in line
with Romero-Medina (1998) and Haeringer and Klijn (2009), who prove the stability of
Nash equilibrium outcomes under (variants of) the DA mechanism.
There is a burgeoning literature on preference estimation using centralized school
choice data. One strand of this literature uses data from settings in which researchers
argue that truth-telling behavior by students is plausible. For example, Hastings, Kane
and Staiger (2008) use data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg public school district, and Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu et al. (Forthcoming) study school choice data from New York City, which
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is a “lottery” setting.4 Both papers estimate student preferences under the assumption
that students truthfully report their preferences. In the same spirit, assuming students
report their true preferences in surveys, Budish and Cantillon (2012) and De Haan, Gau-
tier, Oosterbeek and Van der Klaauw (2015) use reported student ordinal preferences to
conduct analysis without estimating preferences.
The second strand of the empirical literature explicitly considers strategic behavior of
students when estimating student preferences, especially when the mechanism is known
not to be strategy-proof, e.g., the (Boston) immediate-acceptance mechanism (Agarwal
and Somaini, 2014; Calsamiglia, Fu and Gu¨ell, 2014; He, 2015; Hwang, 2014; Kapor,
Neilson and Zimmerman, 2016). Due to the lack of strategy-proofness, observed ROLs
are sometimes considered as solutions to the maximization of students’ expected utility.
Taking estimated admission probabilities as students’ beliefs, one could adopt the same
approach to our setting, i.e., a discrete choice problem defined on the set of possible
ROLs. However, we do not apply this expected-utility-maximization approach for several
reasons. First, degenerate admission probabilities can occur in various cases, leading
to multiple solutions to a student’s expected-utility maximization problem (He, 2015).
This creates issues for identification of student preferences. In the strict-priority setting,
admission probabilities are more likely to be degenerate. Second, the choice probability
of a given ROL has to be evaluated against a large number of possible ROLs, which
can be computationally cumbersome.5 Third, the cost of ranking/applying to additional
schools, especially the part related to cognitive load, is often not observed, and one would
need to impose additional assumptions to take the cost into account in the maximization
of expected utility.
As to the strict-priority setting, there are only a handful of empirical studies. Among
them, the majority use ad-hoc solutions to the potential problem of students’ non-truth-
telling behavior. In analyzing school choice in the U.K., where proximity to schools is used
as a tie-breaker in determining admission to oversubscribed primary schools, Burgess et
al. (2014) restrict each student’s set of schools to those that are in close proximity to the
student’s residence. In the context of admissions to secondary schools in Ghana, where
priority is determined by exam scores, Ajayi (2017) only considers a subset of schools
4The authors perform robustness checks on the truth-telling assumption, e.g., only considering stu-
dents’ top three submitted choices.
5For example, there are S!{pS Kq! lists ranking 1 ¤ K ¤ S schools.
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with similar selectivity. Akyol and Krishna (2017) is an exception in this literature.
Observing the matching outcome and the cutoffs of high school admissions in Turkey, the
authors estimate preferences based on the assumption that every student is assigned to
her favorite feasible school, which amounts to assuming stability of the matching outcome.
We formalize and clarify this stability assumption, along with other extensions. Although
stability is a rather common identifying assumption in the two-sided matching literature
(see the surveys by Fox, 2009; Chiappori and Salanie´, 2016), it is new in empirical studies
of school choice and college admissions.
Lastly, estimation of student preferences with college admissions data remains under-
explored. It is a challenging problem partly because college admissions are sometimes
decentralized. Avery, Glickman, Hoxby and Metrick (2013) overcome this difficulty by
focusing on students’ choice among admission offers. Alternatively, Long (2004) assumes
that a student can enroll in any college and attends her most-preferred one, while Black,
Cortes and Lincove (2015) investigate college application behavior of students. With data
from a decentralized system where applications are relayed by a platform, Drewes and
Michael (2006) assume that students rank programs truthfully when submitting the non-
binding ROLs. The centralized college admissions include many applications of the DA
mechanism (see Table 1).6 The specifics of the mechanism have led to numerous studies on
the causal effects of education (e.g., Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2015; Kirkebøen,
Leuven and Mogstad, 2016), but not yet on preference estimation. The only exception is
Kirkebøen (2012) who applies a rank-ordered logit model under the truth-telling assump-
tion and sometimes excludes from a student’s choice set every college program at which
the student does not meet the formal requirements or is below its previous-year cutoff.
Organization of the Paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the
model that provides our theoretical foundation for preference estimation. Section 2 dis-
cusses the corresponding empirical approaches and tests, which are illustrated in Monte
Carlo simulations in Section 3. School choice in Paris, and our results on estimation and
testing with the Parisian data, are shown in Section 4. Section 5 discusses practical con-
siderations for applying our approaches to real-world data and outlines some extensions.
Section 6 concludes.
6Some centralized college admissions do not use the DA mechanism. For example, studying the
mechanism allocating students to majors at colleges in Brazil, Carvalho, Magnac and Xiong (2014)
model the joint decision of exam taking and college choice.
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1 The Model
To study student behavior, we extend the model in Azevedo and Leshno (2016) by intro-
ducing cardinal preferences. An economy, as a school choice/college admissions problem,
consists of a finite set of schools or colleges, S  t1, . . . , Su, and a set of students. Stu-
dent i has a type θi  pui, eiq P Θ  r0, 1sSr0, 1sS, where ui  pui,1,    , ui,Sq P r0, 1sS is
a vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities of being assigned to schools, and
ei  pei,1,    , ei,Sq P r0, 1sS is a vector of priority indices at schools, a student with a
higher index having a higher priority at a school. To simplify notation, we assume that
all schools and students are acceptable.7 Students are matched with schools through a
centralized mechanism.
The continuum economy with a unit mass of students is denoted by E  tG, q, Cu,
whereG is an atomless probability measure over Θ representing the distribution of student
population over types; q  pq1,    , qSq are masses of seats available at each school, where
0   qs   1 for all s; lastly, C represents an application cost to be specified shortly. G
being atomless implies a measure-zero set of students with indifference in either student
utilities or priority indices.
A random finite economy of size I is denoted by F pIq  tGpIq, qpIq, Cu. F pIq is con-
structed by independently drawing from the distribution (G) I students, indexed by
i P t1,    , Iu, and adjusting the numbers of seats to integers. More specifically, GpIq
is the (random) empirical distribution of student types for a sample of I students;8
qpIq  rq  Is{I is the supply of seats per student, where rxs is the vector of integers
nearest to x (with a rounding down in case of a tie). We use Fˆ pIq  tGˆpIq, qpIq, Cu to
denote a realization of F pIq.
In the following, we start with F pIq to specify the matching process and to analyze
student behavior, because empirical studies deal with finite economies; the extension to
the continuum economy E is deferred to Section 1.4.
In a realization of the random economy, Fˆ pIq, schools first announce their capacities,
and every student then submits a rank-order list (ROL) of 1 ¤ Ki ¤ S schools, denoted
7Assuming acceptability of all schools justifies the normalization of u P r0, 1sS . Although we could
extend the preference domain to allow for negative values, this would create the possibility that students
avoid being assigned to schools with negative vNM utilities when maximizing expected utility.
8For a realized economy with realized student types pθ1,    , θIq, the realized empirical distribution
GˆpIq is defined as GˆpIqpθq  1I
°I
i1 1pθi ¤ θq @θ P R2S , where 1pq is an indicator function.
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by Li 
 
l1i , . . . , l
Ki
i

, where lki P S is i’s kth choice. Li also represents the set of schools
being ranked in Li. We define ¡Li such that s ¡Li s
1 if and only if school s is ranked
above school s1 in Li. The set of all possible ROLs is L, which includes all ROLs ranking
at least one school. Student i’s true ordinal preference induced by her vNM utilities ui
is denoted by rpuiq 
 
r1i , . . . , r
S
i
 P L.
When submitting an ROL, a student incurs a cost C p|L|q, which depends on the
number of schools being ranked in L, |L|. Furthermore, C p|L|q P r0, 8s for all L and is
weakly increasing in |L|. To simplify students’ participation decisions, we set C p1q  0.
Such a cost function flexibly captures many common applications of school choice
mechanisms. If C p|L|q  0 for all L, we are in the traditional setting without costs (e.g.,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003); if C p|L|q  8 for |L| greater than a constant K, it
corresponds to the constrained school choice where students cannot rank more than K
schools (e.g., Haeringer and Klijn, 2009); when C p|L|q  cp|L|Kq, students have to pay
a constant marginal cost c for each choice beyond the first K choices, as in Hungarian
college admissions (Biro´, 2011); the monotonic cost function can simply reflect that it is
cognitively burdensome to rank too many schools.
The student-school match is then solved by a mechanism that takes into account stu-
dents’ ROLs and schools’ rankings over students. Our main analysis focuses on the
student-proposing Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA), leaving the discussion of
school-proposing Deferred Acceptance to Section 5.2. DA, as a computerized algorithm,
works as follows:
Round 1. Every student applies to her first choice. Each school rejects the lowest-
ranked students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the other students.
Generally, in:
Round k. Every student who is rejected in Round pk  1q applies to the next choice
on her list. Each school, pooling together new applicants and those it holds from Round
pk  1q, rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity. Those who are not
rejected are temporarily held by the schools.
The process terminates after any Round k when no rejections are issued. Each school
is then matched with the students it is currently holding.
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1.1 Information Structure and Decision-Making
In any realization of the finite economy, Fˆ pIq, consistent with how the economy is con-
structed, every student’s preferences and priority indices are private information, and
are i.i.d. draws from G, which is common knowledge (but GˆpIq, the realization of GpIq,
remains unknown).9
Let us start by analyzing the game from student i’s point of view. Conditional on
others’ priority indices and submitted ROLs (Li, ei), as well as i’s submitted list Li
and priority index ei, i’s admission outcome is deterministic because of the algorithm.
Specifically, the outcome at school s is:
as pLi, ei;Li, eiq

$&
% 1
 
i is rejected by l1i , . . . , l
k
i and accepted by l
k 1
i  s | Li, ei;Li, ei

0
if s P Li
if s R Li
where 1p | Li, ei;Li, eiq is an indicator function. Moreover, due to the centralized
mechanism, a student can receive at most one offer, so
°S
s1 as pLi, ei;Li, eiq  0 or 1.
Of course, Li and ei are unknown to i at the time of submitting her ROL, so i takes
into account the distribution when choosing an action.
A pure strategy is σ : Θ Ñ L. Given σ, the (ex ante) admission probabilities are³
as pσpθiq, ei;σipθiq, eiq dGpθiq for all i and s, where σipθiq  tσpθjquji. We con-
sider a (type-)symmetric equilibrium σ in pure strategies such that σ solves the following
maximization problem for every student type:10
σpθiq P arg max
σpθiqPL
#¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as
 
σpθiq, ei;σipθiq, ei

dGpθiq  C p|σpθiq|q
+
. (1)
The existence of pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be established by applying
Theorem 4 (Purification Theorem) in Milgrom and Weber (1985), although there might
be multiple equilibria. For ease of exposition, the following analysis focuses on pure-
strategy equilibrium. While economy F pIq is random, it should be emphasized that a
strategy σ is “deterministic” in the sense that it only depends on pG, I, Cq but not the
9In the previous literature, some papers assume complete information, for example Ergin and So¨nmez
(2006), Haeringer and Klijn (2009), Kojima (2008), and Pathak and So¨nmez (2008); student preferences
and priorities are common knowledge. Incomplete information, similar to ours, is also common, for
example, Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2011), Miralles (2008), and He (2015).
10It is innocuous to focus on symmetric equilibrium, because it does not restrict the strategy of any
student given that they all have different priority indices (almost surely).
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realization of F pIq.
We define a realized matching µˆ as a mapping from Θ to SYtHu such that: (i) µˆ pθiq  s
if student i is matched with s; (ii) µˆ pθiq  H if student i is unmatched; and (iii) µˆ1psq
is the set of students matched with s, while |µˆ1psq| is the number of students matched
with s and does not exceed s’s capacity.
Fˆ pIq and σ together lead to a ROL profile as inputs into the DA mechanism and result
in a matching, µpFˆ pIq,σq, which is uniquely determined by the DA mechanism. Note that
µpF pIq,σq is a random matching because F pIq is a random economy.
Moreover, the (random) cutoff of school s in random matching µpF pIq,σq is defined as:
Ps

µpF pIq,σq
	

$&
% min
!
ei,s | µpF pIq,σq pθiq  s
)
0
if |µ1pF pIq,σq psq |  q
pIq
s
if |µ1pF pIq,σq psq |   q
pIq
s
That is, Ps

µpF pIq,σq
	
is zero if s does not meet its capacity; otherwise, it is the lowest pri-
ority index among all accepted students. The vector of cutoffs is denoted by P

µpF pIq,σq
	
,
and its realization in Fˆ pIq is P

µpFˆ pIq,σq
	
.
1.2 Truth-Telling Behavior in Equilibrium
To assess the plausibility of the truth-telling assumption in empirical studies, we begin
by investigating students’ truth-telling behavior in equilibrium.
A clarification of the concepts is in order. Student i is weakly truth-telling (WTT,
hereafter) if σpθiq  pr1i , r2i , . . . , rKi q for K ¤ S. That is, i ranks her K most-preferred
schools according to her true preference order but may not rank all available schools. If a
WTT strategy always truthfully ranks all S schools and thus σpθiq  rpuiq, i is strictly
truth-telling (STT, hereafter).11
We emphasize the difference between weak and strict truth-telling because the theo-
retical result of strategy-proofness concerns the latter. However, WTT is often considered
in empirical studies because in practice, students rarely rank all available schools, as we
shall revisit in Section 2.2.
It is well known that DA is strategy-proof when there is no application cost (Dubins
11Related to the distinction between STT and WTT, the literature on lab experiments on school choice
sometimes also defines truth-telling as being different from STT. For example, Chen and So¨nmez (2006)
call a student truth-telling under the DA mechanism if she ranks her most-preferred schools up to her
district school, at which she has guaranteed admission.
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and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). That is, when C p|L|q  0 for all L P L, STT is a
weakly-dominant strategy for all students.
Strategy-proofness, or weak dominance of STT, leaves open the possibility of multiple
equilibria when every student can rank all schools at no cost. In fact, even when all others
play STT, there might exist multiple best responses for a given student. There is no hope
of finding conditions to make STT a strictly-dominant strategy either, because it would
require STT to be strictly better than all other possible strategies against all possible
action profiles of other students.
If we assume that the equilibrium where everyone plays STT is always selected, we
implicitly impose a selection rule. It is therefore useful to clarify the conditions under
which STT is the unique equilibrium. The following example highlights two sources of
equilibrium multiplicity in a complete-information environment.
Example 1 (Multiple Equilibria under DA without Application Cost). Let us
consider a finite economy with three students (i1, i2, i3), three one-seat schools (s1, s2, s3),
and no application cost. As common knowledge, school priority ranking and student
ordinal preferences are as follows:
School priority ranking
(high to low)
Student ordinal preferences
(more to less preferred)
s1: i1, i2, i3 i1: s1, s2, s3
s2: i1, i2, i3 i2: s1, s2, s3
s3: i1, i2, i3 i3: s2, s1, s3
The game has many equilibria in addition to STT, coming from two sources: “ir-
relevance at the bottom” and “skipping the impossible.” Both arise when some
admission probabilities are zero.
In this complete-information setting, for i1, the lower part of her submitted ROL is
“payoff-irrelevant” as long as s1 is top-ranked, because i1 has zero probability of getting
into any school other than s1. In fact, any ROL of the form (s1, s
1, s2) for any s1, s2 P
ts2, s3u Y tHu, is weakly dominant for i1. This happens when a student is certain to be
accepted by her earlier choices. This same applies to i2 as well: it is payoff-irrelevant
whether or not i2 ranks s3 after s2, given s2 is ranked.
For i2 and i3, “skipping the impossible” comes into play. Both students can omit
s1 from their submitted ROLs without harming their payoffs, because the seat at s1 will
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be taken by i1 in any equilibrium. Making things worse, for both i2 and i3, how they
rank s1 does not matter for their equilibrium payoffs. Additionally, for i3, s2 is also an
“impossible” school, which means that her equilibrium strategy can be anything as long as
s3 is included in her submitted ROL.
One may conjecture that STT might survive as the unique equilibrium when infor-
mation is incomplete. Indeed, specifying the incompleteness of information, the following
proposition provides a sufficient condition.
Proposition 1. STT is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium under DA if (i) there is
no application cost: C p|L|q  0, @L P L; and (ii) the joint distribution of preferences
and priorities G has full support.
All proofs can be found in Appendix A. The first condition is violated if students
cannot rank as many schools as they wish, or if they suffer a cognitive burden when
ranking too many schools. It should also be emphasized that the cost need not be large,
because the marginal benefit of ranking an additional school can be close to zero. When
a student considers her admission probability at her kth choice, she may face a very large
probability of being accepted by at least one of her earlier choices. This is in the same
spirit as the “irrelevance at the bottom” in Example 1.
The full-support condition makes all admission probabilities non-zero by introducing
uncertainties, and therefore any deviation from STT is costly. This is more plausible
when the priority index is determined by an ex post lottery and when the information
on others’ preferences over schools is less precise.
Proposition 1 specifies when students have incentives to rank all schools truthfully,
but this result does not extend to WTT. As the equilibrium condition, Equation (1)
implies that a student may omit her most-preferred school if the admission probability
is close to zero, thus violating WTT. This is precisely the “skipping the impossible”
behavior discussed in Example 1.
We may take one step back and focus on whether students have incentives to rank the
included schools truthfully. We call Li, |Li| ¤ S, a partial preference order of schools
if Li respects the true preference ordering among those ranked in Li. That is, s is ranked
before s1 in Li, only if ui,s ¡ ui,s1 ; when s is not ranked in Li, there is no information on
how s is ranked relative to any other school according to i’s true preferences.
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Proposition 2. Under DA with application cost, it is a weakly-dominated strategy to
submit an ROL that is not a partial preference order.
Proposition 2 can be considered as a corollary of Proposition 4.2 in Haeringer and Klijn
(2009), and thus we omit its proof. The key is to note that such an ROL is dominated
by the ROL that ranks the same schools according to their true preference order.
1.3 Matching Outcome: Stability
The above results speak to the plausibility of the truth-telling assumptions WTT and
STT in empirical studies. In particular, WTT is not theoretically supported as a weakly-
dominant strategy even in DA with no application cost; whenever there is any form of
application cost, STT is no longer a dominant strategy.
Taking a different perspective, we note that all equilibria have the same matching
outcome in Example 1. This motivates us to investigate the properties of equilibrium
matching outcomes of DA. Intuitively, the degree of multiplicity in equilibrium outcomes
must be smaller than that in equilibrium strategies. In the two-sided matching litera-
ture, stability is the leading concept for equilibrium outcome and the main identifying
assumption (Chiappori and Salanie´, 2016). We investigate whether it can also be the
unique equilibrium outcome in school choice and college admissions.
Unfortunately, we shall demonstrate that having stability as the unique equilibrium
outcome requires similar conditions to those for STT being the unique equilibrium. In
fact, whenever there is application cost, stability is not guaranteed in equilibrium. This is
because Bayesian Nash equilibrium implies ex ante optimality of student strategy, while
stability requires ex post optimality.
Because we study the ex post properties of a matching, let us consider µˆ, a realization
of the random matching. pi, sq form a blocking pair if (i) i prefers s over her matched
school µˆpθiq while s has an empty seat (|µˆ1psq|   qpIqs ), or if (ii) i prefers s over µˆpθiq
while s has no empty seats (|µˆ1psq|  qpIqs ) but i’s priority index is higher than its cutoff,
ei,s ¡ mintj:µˆpθjqsupej,sq. µˆ is stable if there is no blocking pair.
Stability is a concept borrowed from two-sided matching and is also known as elimi-
nation of justified envy in school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). In our
setting, stability can be conveniently linked to school cutoffs. Given a realized matching
µˆ, school s is ex post feasible for i if ei,s ¥ Pspµˆq, and we denote the set of feasible
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schools for i by Spei, P pµˆqq. We then have the following lemma, combining Lemmata 1
and 2 in Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), whose straightforward proof is omitted here.
Lemma 1. A realized matching µˆ is stable if and only if µˆpθiq  arg maxsPSpei,P pµˆqq ui,s
for all i  1,    , I; i.e., every student is matched with her favorite feasible school.
Given that the cutoffs of a matching are observed ex post by the researcher, we can
define every student’s set of feasible schools; Lemma 1 therefore implies a discrete choice
model with personalized choice sets. We further formalize this idea in Section 2.3.
We may also be interested in stability being an outcome of equilibrium in dominant
strategies, which would free us from specifying the information structure and from impos-
ing additional equilibrium conditions. The following lemma provides the necessary and
sufficient conditions, which are similar to those for STT to be the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Under DA, stable matching is an outcome of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
dominant strategy if and only if C p|L|q  0 for all L. It is the unique equilibrium outcome
if additionally G has full support.
The “if and only if” statement of the lemma is implied by strategy-proofness of DA
without application cost, while the uniqueness statement is a result of Proposition 1.
It is well known that DA always produces a stable matching when students are STT
(Gale and Shapley, 1962), but not when they are only WTT. The following results,
clarifying the relationship between WTT and stability, have implications for our empirical
approaches in the next section.
Proposition 3. Suppose everyone is WTT under DA. Given a realized matching:
(i) every assigned student is matched with her favorite feasible school; and
(ii) if everyone who has at least one feasible school is matched, the matching is stable.
1.4 Asymptotic Stability in Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
So far, we have shown that neither truth-telling (STT and WTT) nor stability can emerge
in the game as equilibrium outcome without some potentially restrictive assumptions.
Following the literature on large markets, we study whether stability of the equilibrium
outcome can be asymptotically satisfied.
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We now revisit the continuum economy, E, and additionally introduce a sequence of
random finite economies tF pIquIPN that are constructed from E as before.
We extend our analysis to the continuum economy. The definitions of matching,
DA, and stability can be naturally extended to continuum economies as in Abdulka-
dirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016), which is discussed in
Appendix A.2.1. These definitions are similar to their counterparts in finite economies.
For example, a matching in E when everyone adopts σ is µpE,σq : Θ Ñ S Y tHu, which
satisfies (i) µpE,σqpθiq  s when type θi is matched with s and (ii) Gpµ1pE,σqpsqq ¤ qs.
It is known that, generically, there exists a unique stable matching in the continuum
economy (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016);12 we impose the conditions for the uniqueness and
denote this stable matching in E as µ8 and the corresponding cutoffs as P8. Although
µ8 is unique, there may exist some Nash equilibrium that leads to an unstable matching.
We present such a continuum-economy example in Appendix A.2.5, which extends the
discrete version in Haeringer and Klijn (2009). Citing the results in Haeringer and Klijn
(2009), Appendix A.2.5 further shows that every Nash equilibrium outcome in the con-
tinuum economy is stable if and only if student priority indices at all schools satisfy the
so-called Ergin acyclicity condition. Ergin (2002) calls priority indices acyclical if they
never give rise to situations where a student can block a potential settlement between
any other two students without affecting her own match. This condition is satisfied when
all schools rank every student by a single priority index. In the following, we assume that
all Nash equilibria of the continuum economy E result in the stable matching, which in
practice can be checked using Proposition A3.
Because we are interested in equilibrium outcomes, we augment the sequence of
economies with equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, where σpIq is a pure-strategy Bayesian
12A sufficient condition for the uniqueness of stable outcome in E is that G has full support. Even
when G does not have full support, the uniqueness can be achieved when
°S
s1 qs   1. Let σ
STT be the
STT strategy. That is, σSTT pθiq  rpuiq for all θi. We define the demand for each school in pE, σ
STT q
as a function of the cutoffs:
DspP | E, σ
STT q 
»
1pui,s  max
s1PSpei,P q
ui,s1qdGpθiq,
where 1pq is an indicator function. Let DpP | E, σSTT q  rDspP | E, σqssPS . E admits a unique stable
matching if the image under DpP | E, σSTT q of the closure of the set
tP P p0, 1qS : DpP | E, σSTT q is not continuously differentiable at P u
has Lebesgue measure zero.
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Nash equilibrium in F pIq and satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There exists σ8 such that limIÑ8G
  
θi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiq
(  1.
Although F pIq is a random economy, σpIq is fixed given the size of the economy. In other
words, σpIq remains as an equilibrium strategy in any realization of F pIq. Assumption 1
regulates how the equilibria evolve with market size, which is necessary as there are
multiple equilibria. By this assumption, in the sequence tσpIquIPN, fewer and fewer student
types need to adjust their optimal actions when the market size grows.
We provide some justifications for this assumption in Appendix A.2.4. Lemma A2
shows that a strategy that does not lead to µ8 in the continuum economy cannot sur-
vive as an equilibrium when the market size grows. This immediately implies that in
sufficiently large economies, every student includes in her ROL the school prescribed
by µ8 (Lemma A3). Moreover, students do not pay a cost to rank more schools in
large economies (Lemma A4). These results imply strong restrictions on the sequence of
Bayesian Nash equilibria in the direction of satisfying Assumption 1. Lastly, as Lemma A5
shows, Assumption 1 is exactly satisfied when it is costly to rank more than one school
(Cp2q ¡ 0).
1.4.1 Asymptotic Stability: Definition and Results
Let the random matching µpF pIq,σpIqq be µpIq, and the associated random cutoffs P
 
µpIq

be P pIq. The following definition formalizes the concept of asymptotic stability.13
Definition 1. A sequence of random matchings, tµpIquIPN, associated with the sequence
of random economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, is asymptotically stable
if,
lim
IÑ8
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq  0, almost surely;
or, equivalently, the fraction of students who are not matched with their favorite feasible
school in a random finite economy converges to zero almost surely.
We are now ready to introduce our result.
13We define the probability space, pΩ,F ,Pq. Specifically, Ω ±IPNΘI , and an element in Ω is denoted
by ω  pω1, ω2,    q, where ωI is a possible realization of student types in the random economy F
pIq. F
is a Borel σ-algebra of Ω, and P is a probability measure from F to r0, 1s.
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Proposition 4. In the sequence of random economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN,
if Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
(i) the random cutoffs converge to those of the stable matching in the continuum economy:
limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8, almost surely;
(ii) the sequence of random matchings, tµpIquIPN, is asymptotically stable.
1.4.2 Probability of Being in a Blocking Pair for a Given Student
Based on the above results, we can discuss the probability of a given student being in a
blocking pair. The following proposition shows how economy size, the cost of submitting
a list, and other factors play a role.
Proposition 5. Suppose student i exists in all economies in the sequence tF pIquIPN which
is associated with a sequence of Bayesian Nash equilibria in pure strategies tσpIquIPN.
(i) Let σpIqpθiq  LpIq; then LpIq is a partial order of i’s ordinal preferences. If ex post
i forms a blocking pair with s, s must not be included in LpIq, s P SzLpIq.
The probability that i is in a blocking pair with any school in the random matching
µpIq, denoted by B
pIq
i  PrpDs P S, ui,s ¡ ui,µpIqpθiq, ei,s ¥ P pIqs q, satisfies:
(ii) B
pIq
i is bounded above: B
pIq
i ¤ |SzLpIq|Cp|L
pIq| 1qCp|LpIq|q
max
sPSzLpIq ui,s
;
(iii) If tσpIquIPN satisfies Assumption 1, BpIqi converges to zero almost surely.
Because in equilibrium student i reports a partial order of her true preferences, she
can only form a blocking pair with a school that she did not rank (part i). Therefore,
whenever it is less costly to rank more schools, the probability that i is in a blocking pair
decreases with the marginal application cost (part ii). Together, Proposition 5 shows
that stability is more plausible when the cost of ranking more schools is lower and/or
the market is large. Moreover, in the case of constrained/truncated DA where there is a
limit on the length of ROLs, the higher the number of schools that can be ranked, the
more likely stability is to be satisfied.
2 Empirical Approaches
Building on the theoretical results from the previous section, we formalize the estimation
of student preferences under different sets of assumptions and propose a series of tests to
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select the appropriate approach. To be more concrete, we consider a logit-type random
utility model, although our approaches can be extended to other specifications.
Throughout this section, we consider a random finite economy F pIq in which I students
compete for admission into S distinct schools. Each school s has a positive capacity
I  qs, and students are assigned through some version of the student-proposing DA.
In addition to submitted ROLs and matching outcomes, the researcher also observes
students’ priority indices, student characteristics, and school attributes. Given these
observables, we discuss the “conditional choice probability” of a student submitting a
given ROL or being matched with a given school from the researcher’s perspective.
2.1 Model Setting
As is traditional and more convenient in empirical analysis, we now let the student utility
functions take any value on the real line.14 With some abuse, we still use the same
notation for utility functions. That is, student i’s utility from attending schools s is
defined as:
ui,s  Vi,s   i,s  V pZi,s, βq   i,s, (2)
where V p, q is a known function, taking as arguments Zi,s, a vector of observable student-
school characteristics, and β, a vector of unknown constants to be estimated; i,s is the
unobservable student heterogeneity.
We further define Zi  tZi,suSs1, and i  ti,suSs1. It is assumed that i K Zi
and that i,s is i.i.d. over i and s with the type-I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution.
Such a formulation rules out outside options, although this assumption can be relaxed.
Furthermore, this specification implicitly imposes the following assumption:
Assumption (Maintained).
Let µ be the random matching outcome. Then, ui,sKµ; in other words, ui,s, student i’s
preference of being (hypothetically) matched with s, does not depend on the matching.
This assumption implies that student preferences are not affected by other students’
14In the theoretical discussion, we restricted the vNM utility functions to be in r0, 1s. One can use, for
example, the inverse of standard normal distribution to transform all utility functions to be on the real
line. It should be emphasized that we cannot apply the expected utility theory with the transformed
utility functions, and we do not.
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school assignments (no peer effects). Moreover, statistics that are associated with the
matching outcome, such as cutoffs, do not enter the utility function either.
2.2 Truth-Telling
Recall that empirical studies with application data from college admissions and school
choice with strict priority ranking are still rare, while the empirical literature on school
choice with coarse priority ranking is fast-growing. In this literature, some proposed
approaches are based on the truth-telling assumption (Hastings et al., 2008; Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al., Forthcoming). Given that similar mechanisms are commonly used in both
settings, we discuss how these approaches can be extended to our setting and clarify the
assumptions embedded within.
We start with WTT instead of STT because students in school choice and college
admissions usually do not rank the same number of choices in reality (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., Forthcoming; He, 2015; Artemov, Che and He, 2017). Under the assumption of
truth-telling in the absence of outside option, this can only be consistent with students’
WTT behavior but not STT, because STT requires everyone to rank all schools. We
discuss STT with outside options in Appendix A.3.
For notational convenience, we make it explicit that student i’s type θi is described
by pui, eiq. Let σW : RS  r0, 1sS Ñ L be a WTT pure strategy.15 More precisely, the
WTT assumption amounts to the following two assumptions:
Assumption (Weak Truth-Telling).
WTT1. Suppose σW pui, eiq  L  pl1, . . . , lKq. σW pui, eiq ranks i’s top K preferred
schools according to her true preferences: ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK , and ui,lK ¡ ui,s1 for all s1
not ranked in L;
WTT2. The number of schools ranked by a student is exogenous: ui K |σW pui, eiq|, @i.
We are interested in the choice probability of L conditional on observables, where the
uncertainty from the researcher’s perspective is due to the utility shocks (i). Note that:
Pr
 
σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β
Pr  σW pui, eiq  Lq  Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K Pr  |σW pui, eiq|  K  Zi; β .
15Because the preference space is transformed from r0, 1sS to RS , a strategy is now defined on the
transformed strategy space. Moreover, it will be clear that σW does not depend on priority indices, ei.
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The probabilities are calculated by integrating out the unobservables (i) in ui. Assump-
tion WTT2 implies that Pr
 |σW pui, eiq|  K  Zi; β does not depend on preferences and
is therefore equal to Pr
 |σW pui, eiq|  K. This justifies the decision to focus on the
following conditional probability:
Pr
 
σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K
Pr  ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,s1 @ s1 P SzL  Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K

¹
sPL

exppVi,sq°
s1£Ls
exppVi,s1q

,
where s1 £L s indicates that s
1 is not ranked before s in L, which includes s itself and
the schools not ranked in L. This rank-ordered (or “exploded”) logit model can be seen
as a series of conditional logit models: one for the top-ranked school (l1) being the most
preferred; another for the second-ranked school (l2) being preferred to all schools except
the one ranked first, and so on.
The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with the log-
likelihood function:
lnLTT
 
β
 Z, |σW |  I¸
i1
¸
sPσW pui,eiq
Vi,s 
I¸
i1
¸
sPσW pui,eiq
ln
 ¸
s1£
σW pui,eiq
s
exppVi,s1q
	
,
where |σW | is the vector of lengths of all submitted ROLs. The estimator is denoted
by βˆTT . Alternatively, the generalized method of moment (GMM) can be employed,
for which the moment conditions based on the choice probabilities can be derived as
in Section 2.5. The identification of such a model is discussed in Beggs, Cardell and
Hausman (1981).
2.3 Stability
We now assume that the matching is stable and explore how to identify and estimate
student preferences. The discussion abstracts away from the DA mechanism and ignores
how the stable matching is obtained. We first formulate the matching as the outcome of
a discrete choice model and then clarify the conditions that are needed for identification
and estimation.
Consider that we observe the matching outcome µ and the associated cutoffs P pµq,
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both of which are random variables determined by the unobserved utility shocks (). We
define 8  0  0 and formulate a modified utility function:
ui,s  ui,s 8 1pei,s   Pspµqq  V pZi,s, βq  8  1pei,s   Pspµqq   i,s, (3)
where the term 81tei,s Pspµqu is zero for feasible schools but equal to 8 for infeasible
ones, thus making them always less desirable.
The following lemma shows the equivalence between stable matching and the discrete
choice model based on the modified utility functions.
Lemma 3. A realized matching µˆ is stable if and only if µˆpθiq  µˆpui, eiq  arg maxsPS ui,s.
This lemma is implied by Lemma 1. The formal proof is omitted but a sketch is
as follows. Because of the “penalty” on infeasible schools, the discrete choice problem,
maxsPS ui,s, is equivalent to the utility maximization problem among the feasible schools
with the true utility functions, maxsPSpei,P pµˆqq ui,s.
The above result motivates us to link the identification and estimation of student
preferences under the stability assumption to those in discrete choice models. We can
consider that the set of schools are offered to every student at personalized “prices” that
are either zero or infinite, depending on the student’s priority.16 A stable matching is
equivalent to the equilibrium outcome in which every student makes the optimal choice
given the market-clearing “prices.”
This formulation requires the following assumptions.
Assumption (Stability).
ST1. For all i, eiKi. That is, students do not, or cannot, affect their priority index at
any school based on their preferences.
ST2. 1pei,s   PspµqqKi for all i and s, or equivalently Spei, P pµqqKi: No student can
influence her own set of feasible schools.
Assumption ST1 is analogous to the exogeneity of observables in discrete choice mod-
els. When priority indices (ei) are determined by test scores, the assumption implies that
no student intentionally under-performs or over-performs in exams.
Assumption ST2 deserves some discussion. Essentially, it assumes that students are
“price takers,” or more precisely, that they take school feasibility as given and they cannot
16Representing matching, in particular stable matching, with student demand and personalized
“prices” is also discussed in He, Li and Yan (2015b) and He, Miralles, Pycia and Yan (2015a).
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change 1pei,s   Pspµqq. One may be concerned that, in a finite market, an individual
student can affect some cutoffs by applying to a school or not, and may change the
feasibility of some schools. Another concern is that given student preferences, there can
be multiple stable matchings in a finite market. If a single student can influence the
selection among the stable matchings, Assumption ST2 is also violated.
These concerns diminish as the economy grows large, because the potential influ-
ence on cutoffs by individual students decreases and there tends to be a unique stable
matching. Moreover, even in small markets, Assumption ST2 can be satisfied. Impor-
tantly, the assumption requires 1pei,s   PspµqqKi, or equivalently Spei, P pµqqKi, instead
of P pµqKi; there are cases in which a student can influence cutoffs but not her set of
feasible schools. The following lemma gives an example of such a case.
Lemma 4. When every school ranks students in the same way, or ei,s  ei for all s and
i, Assumption ST2 is always satisfied.
We skip the formal proof but the outline is as follows. In this case, DA is equivalent to
serial dictatorship in which students choose the remaining schools one by one in the order
determined by their priority indices. There will be only one stable matching for each real-
ization of student types. Moreover, the set of feasible schools for student i is determined
by the students with higher priority indices. Because preferences are independent across
students by assumption, we have 1pei,s   PspµqqKi, or Spei, P pµqqKi.
It should be noted that iMP pµq even in this case. For example, when i chooses s
among the feasible schools, the cutoff of s will possibly increase; similarly, i may decrease
s’s cutoff by choosing a different school. However, we always have 1pei,s   PspµqqKi,
because s will remain feasible to i either way.17
Building on Lemma 3 and Assumptions ST1 and ST2, we can write the probability
that student i is matched with s, or, in other words, chooses s conditional on Spei, P pµqq,
17We provide an example in which 1pei,s   PspµqqMi for some i. Let I  3 and S  3, each with one
seat. Students have the same preferences, pui,1, ui,2, ui,3q  p0.9, 0.6, 0.3q for i P t1, 2, 3u; the priority
index vectors pei,1, ei,2, ei,3q are p0.8, 0.5, 0.8q for i  1, p0.5, 0.8, 0.3q for i  2, and p0.3, 0.3, 0.5q for i  3.
Suppose students are strictly truth-telling. That is, everyone ranks every school truthfully, and there-
fore the matching outcome is stable. The cutoffs are P  p0.8, 0.8, 0.5q, which leads to Spe1, P q  t1, 3u.
However, if pui,1, ui,2, ui,3q  p0.6, 0.9, 0.3q for i  1, then P
1  p0.5, 0.5, 0.5q and Spe1, P 1q  t1, 2, 3u.
Therefore, for i  1, 1pe1,s   PspµqqM1.
In this example, the endogeneity of the set of feasible schools occurs for students who are close to the
observed cutoffs. We conjecture that the fraction of such students can be small in large markets.
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as follows:
Pr

s  arg max
sPS
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P pµqq; β


Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s | Zi, ei,Spei, P pµqq; β

,
in which s is a given school and arg maxsPSpei,P pµqq ui,s or µpui, eiq are random variables
depending on the unobserved i. Given the parametric assumptions on utility functions,
the corresponding (conditional) log-likelihood function is:
lnLST pβ | Z, e,Spei, P pµqqq 
I¸
i1
S¸
s1
Vi,s  1pµpui, eiq  sq 
I¸
i1
ln
 ¸
s1PSpei,P pµqq
exppVi,s1q
	
.
(4)
The MLE estimator under the stability assumption is denoted by βˆST . Similarly, a GMM
estimator can also be applied, as detailed in Section 2.5.
Identification. The above discussion transforms the matching game into a discrete
choice model.18 Therefore, the (nonparametric) identification arguments for discrete
choice models still apply (Matzkin, 1993).19
An important feature in the stability-based estimation is that students face person-
alized choice sets. In principle, as long as the choice sets are determined exogenously,
which is true in our model, the identification goes through.
Another concern is that a student’s priority index may enter her utility functions di-
rectly, when, for example, priority indices are determined by test score or student ability.
In this case, the stability assumption does not reveal information about low-scoring stu-
dents’ preferences over popular schools, because such schools are often infeasible to them.
This may lead to a failure of identifying how test scores determine student preferences.
This problem can be mitigated if we have another measure of student ability, which is
18A simplification is that we ignore the restrictions implied by the cutoffs P pµq, which may lead to
efficiency loss in estimation. That is, even when the sets of feasible schools are exogenous to every
single student’s preferences, P pµq is endogenously determined by the model’s parameters. However,
the additional information in these restrictions may be negligible, given we use the information on the
whole matching already. An earlier version of the paper relaxes this assumption and uses the restrictions
implied by the cutoffs. Our estimation results from simulated data and school choice data from Paris
show that using the cutoff restrictions makes a negligible difference in the estimation results.
19Moreover, as we shall see in Section 2.4, WTT implies additional restrictions beyond those from
stability. Therefore, student preferences are also (non-parametrically) identified under the WTT as-
sumption.
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the case in our empirical exercise. As an exclusion restriction, we assume that conditional
on student ability, student priority indices do not determine preferences and only affect
school feasibility. If, additionally, student priority indices have full support (i.e., can
take any possible value) at each given level of student ability, we will observe low-ability
students having all schools feasible. This will restore nonparametric identification in
discrete choice models as in Matzkin (1993).
Relative to WTT or STT, the stability assumption uses unambiguously less infor-
mation from the data. Both WTT and STT utilize all information implied by the sub-
mitted ROLs, while stability only implies restrictions on matching outcome. Naturally,
one may be concerned that taking the approach based on stability leads to a substan-
tial loss of identification power; in particular, we may lose identification of substitution
patterns when we allow for more flexible random utility models (Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, 2004; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., Forthcoming). Indeed, as we shall see in our Monte
Carlo simulations and analysis of the data on school choice in Paris, there is a clear bias-
variance tradeoff: stability tolerates non-truth-telling behavior at the cost of yielding less
precise estimates.
Identification and Estimation with Asymptotic Stability. When taking the above
results to real-life data, one may be concerned that the observed matching is not exactly
stable. Indeed, our theoretical results only prove asymptotic stability. This raises the
question of whether MLE and GMM are still consistent, and the answer relies on the
convergence rates of the estimators and the matching outcome. We bound the speed of
convergence to stability in Appendix A.2.3. For any constant 0   η   1, the probability
that the fraction of students who can form a blocking pair in F pIq is more than η converges
to zero exponentially (Proposition A2). This implies that the MLE and GMM estimators
are consistent, as they have a convergence rate of root-I when stability is exactly satisfied
(Newey and McFadden, 1994).
2.4 Testing Truth-Telling against Stability
Having two distinct estimators, βˆTT and βˆST , for the parameters of the random utility
model makes it possible to test the truth-telling assumption against stability. We now
maintain the assumption of identification given stability; we shall see shortly that WTT
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thus provides over-identifying restrictions and can be tested. In practice, one should
check that the conditions for identification (for example, those in Matzkin, 1993) are
satisfied before conducting the test.
As summarized in Proposition 3, if every student is WTT and is assigned to a school,
the matching outcome is stable. Stability, however, does not imply that students are
WTT and is therefore a less restrictive assumption.
To see the additional restrictions from WTT, let us consider student i who submits a
K-choice list L and is matched with a school s. Therefore, s must be ranked in L. WTT
implies the following conditions on the choice probability:
Pr
 
σW pui, eiq  L
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K
Pr

ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,s1 , @s1 P SzL
 Zi; β; |σW pui, eiq|  K; s  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s

 Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi; β;Spei, P pµqq

(5)
This equality uses the fact that the event,
 
ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lKi ¡ ui,s1@s1 P SzL

, implies 
s  arg maxsPSpei,P pµqq ui,s

but not the reverse.20 This is because i’s feasible schools are
either ranked below s in L or are omitted from L; in either case, WTT requires that s
is preferred to any other feasible school. Therefore, the first conditional probability on
the right-hand side of the equality cannot always be one. As the restrictions implied
by stability are just Pr
 
s  µpui, eiq  arg maxsPSpei,P pµqq ui,s | Zi; β;Spei, P pµqq

, the ad-
ditional restrictions from WTT are summarized in the first term. When the model is
identified under stability, Equation (5) summarizes the over-identifying restrictions.
Hausman Test. Our estimator βˆTT uses all the restrictions implied by WTT. There-
fore, under the null hypothesis that students are WTT, both estimators βˆTT and βˆST
are consistent but only βˆTT is asymptotically efficient. Under the alternative that the
matching outcome is stable but students are not WTT, only βˆST is consistent.
In this setting, the general specification test developed by Hausman (1978) can be
20We also make use of the exogeneity of the set of feasible schools (Assumption ST2) and the exogeneity
of the length of submitted ROL (Assumption WTT2). Therefore,
Pr

s  µpui, eiq  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi;β;Spei, P pµqq

 Pr

s  arg max
sPSpei,P pµqq
ui,s
 Zi;β; |σW pui, eiq|  K

.
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applied by computing the following test statistic:
TH  pβˆST  βˆTT q1pVˆST  VˆTT q1pβˆST  βˆTT q,
where pVˆST  VˆTT q1 is the inverse of the difference between the asymptotic covariance
matrices of βˆST and βˆTT . Under the null hypothesis, TH  χ2pdβq, where dβ is the
dimension of β. If the model is correctly specified and the matching is stable, the rejection
of the null hypothesis implies that (weak) truth-telling is violated in the data.
Testing Over-identifying Restrictions. The key assumption in the above Hausman
test is that we have a consistent and efficient estimator, βˆTT . When relying on MLE or
GMM, this may require parametric assumptions to achieve efficiency. An alternative is
to construct a test for over-identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is made feasible
because of the nesting structure of WTT and stability due to Proposition 3. Instead of
requiring βˆTT to be (completely) efficient, the test for over-identifying restrictions only
requires that βˆTT utilizes more restrictions than βˆST . Based on Equation (5), we can
separate out the additional restrictions and test whether they are satisfied based on the
test proposed by Hansen (1982).
2.5 Undominated Strategies and Stability
2.5.1 Undominated Strategies without Assuming Stability
The estimation method described in Section 2.3 is only valid when the matching outcome
is stable. However, as we have shown theoretically, stability can fail. Without stability,
one may consider the undominated-strategy assumption. Under the rationality assump-
tion that students play undominated strategies, observed ROLs are students’ true partial
preference orders in the context of the student-proposing DA. That is, every submitted
ROL, Li, respects student i’s true preference ordering among the schools ranked in Li.
These partial orders provide information that can be used to identify student prefer-
ences, but only partially, because the econometric structure is now incomplete (Tamer,
2003). In other words, for a student with type pui, eiq, the assumption of undominated
strategies does not predict a unique ROL for the student. As we shall see, undominated
strategies lead to a set of inequality restrictions that can be satisfied by a set of β’s,
instead of a unique vector of β. Therefore, we lose point identification.
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Moment inequalities. Students’ submitted ROLs can be used to form conditional
moment inequalities. Without loss of generality, consider two schools s1 and s2. Since
not everyone ranks both schools, the probability of i, who adopts the strategy σpui, eiq,
ranking s1 before s2, i.e., s1 ¡σpui,eiq s2, is:
Pr
 
s1 ¡σpui,eiq s2 | Zi; β
 Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 and s1, s2 P σpui, eiq | Zi; βq
¤Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq (6)
The first equality is because of undominated strategy, and the inequality defines a lower
bound for the conditional probability of ui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 . Similarly, one can derive an upper
bound:
Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq ¤ 1 Pr
 
s2 ¡σpui,eiq s1 | Zi; β

. (7)
Inequalities (6) and (7) yield the following conditional moment inequalities:
Prpui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq  E

1ps1 ¡σpui,eiq s2q | Zi; β
 ¥ 0;
1 E 1ps2 ¡σpui,eiq s1q | Zi; β Pr pui,s1 ¡ ui,s2 | Zi; βq ¥ 0.
Similar inequalities can be computed for any pair of schools, and the above inequalities
can be generalized to any n schools in S, where 2 ¤ n ¤ S. In the simulations and
empirical analysis, we focus on inequalities derived with two schools. The bounds become
uninformative if n ¥ 3, because not many schools are simultaneously ranked by the
majority of students. We further interact Zi with the above conditional inequalities and
thus obtain M1 unconditional moment inequalities, pm1, . . . ,mM1q.21
Estimation with Moment Inequalities. To obtain consistent point estimates with
moment inequalities, one can follow the approach of Andrews and Shi (2013), which is
valid for both point and partial identifications. The objective function is a test statis-
tic, TMIpβq, of the Cramer-von Mises type with the modified method of moments (or
sum function). This test statistic is constructed as follows from the previously defined
unconditional moment inequalities:
TMIpβq 
M1¸
j1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2

(8)
21Such variables in Zi are known as instruments in the method of moments literature.
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where m¯jpβq and σˆjpβq are the sample mean and standard deviation of the jth moment,
mjpβq, respectively; and the operator r s is such that ras  mint0, au. We denote the
point estimate βˆMI , which minimizes TMIpβq, and, to construct the marginal confidence
intervals, one can use the method in Bugni, Canay and Shi (2017). For a given coordinate
βk of β, the authors provide a test for the null hypothesis H0 : βk  β0, for any given
β0 P R. The confidence interval for the true value of βk is the convex hull of all β0’s for
which H0 is not rejected.
While it may seem attractive to assume that students play undominated strategies,
it should be noted that only relying on moment inequalities often leads to uninformative
bounds on parameters of interest, given the current state of the art of econometric tech-
niques. This motivates us to consider combining the inequalities with restrictions implied
by stability, when there are reasons to believe that stability can be satisfied.
2.5.2 Stability and Undominated Strategies
An important advantage of the stability assumption is that it only requires data on
the matching outcomes. However, as submitted ROLs are often observed, one might
prefer to use the information contained in such data as well. Under the assumption that
stability provides point identification of student preferences, these partial orders provide
over-identifying information that can be used in combination with stability to estimate
student preferences.
The potential benefits from this approach can be illustrated through a simple example.
Consider a constrained/truncated DA where students are only allowed to rank up to
three schools out of four. With personalized sets of feasible schools under the stability
assumption, the preferences over two schools, say s1 and s2, are estimated mainly from the
sub-sample of students who are assigned to either of these schools while having priority
indices above the cutoffs of both. Yet it is possible that all students include s1 and s2
in their ROLs, even if these schools are not ex post feasible for some students. In such
a situation, all students could be used to estimate the preference ranking of s1 and s2,
rather than just a sub-sample. As shown below, this argument can be extended to the
case where two or more schools are observed being ranked by a subset of students.
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Moment equalities. To combine the above over-identifying information in ROLs with
that from stability, we reformulate the likelihood function described in Equation (4) into
moment equalities. The “choice” probability of the matched school can be rewritten as a
moment condition by equating theoretical and empirical probabilities:
I¸
i1
Pr

s  arg max
s1PSpei,P q
pui,s1q | Zi, P pµq; β
	
 E
 I¸
i1
1pµpui, eiq  sq
	
 0, @s P S,
where 1pµpui, eiq  sq is an indicator function taking the value of one if and only if
µpui, eiq  s. We again interact the variables in Z with the above conditions, leading to
M2 moment equalities, pmM1 1, . . . ,mM1 M2q.
Estimation with Moment (In)equalities. To obtain consistent point estimates with
both equality and inequality moments (henceforth, moment (in)equalities), we can aug-
ment the test statistic defined in Equation (8) to incorporate the additional M2 uncon-
ditional moment equalities:
TMEIpβq 
M1¸
j1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2

 
M1 M2¸
jM1 1

m¯jpβq
σˆjpβq
2
. (9)
We denote the point estimate βˆMEI , which minimizes TMEIpβq, and we can take the same
approach as in Section 2.5.1 to construct marginal confidence intervals for β.
2.6 Testing Stability against Undominated Strategies
Given identification of student preferences under stability, the moment inequalities add
over-identifying information to the moment equalities implied by stability, which consti-
tutes a test of stability, provided that students do not play dominated strategies. More
precisely, if both assumptions are satisfied, the moment (in)equality model in Section 2.5
should yield a point estimate that fits the data relatively well; otherwise, there should
not exist a point β that satisfies all moment (in)equalities. Formally, we follow the
specification test in Bugni et al. (2015).
It should be noted that, for the above test, we maintain the undominated-strategies
assumption, which might raise concerns, because students could make mistakes as docu-
mented in several high-stake real-life contexts; moreover, untrue partial preference order-
ing is not dominated under school-proposing DA. We revisit these issues in Section 5.2.
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The discussion in Section 2.5.1 provides another test of the undominated-strategies
assumption, which also relies on the non-emptyness of the identified set under the null
hypothesis (Bugni et al., 2015). That is, if there is no value of β satisfying the mo-
ment inequalities, the undominated-strategies assumption is not satisfied. It should be
noted that the available methods of moment (in)equalities tend to result in conservative
confidence sets of parameters, which implies that this test may lack power.
3 Results from Monte Carlo Simulations
To illustrate the proposed estimation approaches and tests, we carry out Monte Carlo
(MC) simulations, the details of which are consigned to Appendix C.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the school choice game is simulated in two distinct
settings where I students compete for admission to 6 schools with per capita capacities
tqsu6s1  t0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3u.22 The first is the constrained/truncated DA
where students are allowed to rank up to K schools (K   6). The second setting, which
we refer to as DA with cost, allows students to rank as many schools as they wish but
imposes a constant marginal cost c per additional school in the list after the first choice.
Student preferences over schools are generated using a parsimonious version of the
random utility model in Section 2.1:
ui,s  αs  di,s   3pai  a¯sq   i,s, (10)
where αs is school s’s fixed effects; di,s is the walking distance from student i’s residence
to school s; ai is student i’ ability; a¯s is school s’s quality; and i,s is an error term
that is drawn from the type-I extreme value distribution. Student priority indices are
constructed such that (i) student i’s priority index at each school is correlated with her
ability ai with a correlation coefficient of 0.7; (ii) i’s priority indices at any two schools s
and s1 are also correlated with correlation coefficient 0.7.
Several lessons can be drawn from these simulations. The first key result is that in
both settings, the distribution of school cutoffs is close to jointly normal and degenerates
as the number of seats and the number of students I increase proportionally while holding
22The details on solving equilibrium are described in Appendix C.2. In general, there are multiple
equilibria. The results presented in the paper are from the equilibrium that is found by our computational
algorithm.
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Figure 1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of Economy Size on the Equilibrium Dis-
tribution of Cutoffs (Constrained/Truncated DA)
Notes: This figure shows the marginal distribution of school cutoffs in equilibrium under the constrained/truncated DA
(ranking 4 out of 6 schools) when varying the number of students, I, who compete for admission to 6 schools with a total
enrollment capacity of I  0.95 seats. Using 500 simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal
bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command. See Appendix C for details on the Monte Carlo simulations.
constant the number of schools (see Figure 1); the matching outcome is “almost” stable
(i.e., almost every student is assigned to her favorite feasible school) even in moderately-
sized economies. By contrast, WTT is often violated among the majority of the students,
even when they can rank 5 out of 6 schools (constrained DA) or when the cost of includ-
ing an extra school is negligibly small (DA with cost).23 When the cost of ranking more
schools becomes larger, Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game can result in all students
submitting fewer than 6 schools even when they are allowed to rank all of them. Based
on these results, observing that only a few students make full use of their ranking oppor-
tunities may not be viewed as a compelling argument in favor of truth-telling when the
application cost is a legitimate concern.
The second important insight from the MC simulations is that the stability assumption
leads to estimates much closer to the true values than WTT. Table 2 reports the results
from estimating student preferences under each of the following assumptions: (i) weak
truth-telling (columns 2–4); (ii) stability (columns 5–7); and (iii) stability and undomi-
nated strategies (columns 8–10). The results in Panel A are for the constrained/truncated
DA where students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools. Those in Panel B are for the
23Consistent with the theoretical predictions from Section 1.4.2, our simulations show that the fraction
of students who are matched with their favorite feasible school decreases with the cost of ranking more
schools. However, violations of stability are rare unless students face very large application costs (see
Figure C4 in the Appendix).
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Table 2: Monte Carlo Results (500 Students, 6 Schools, 500 Samples)
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability
Stability and
undominated
strategies
True value Mean SD CP Mean SD CP Mean SD CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A. Constrained/Truncated DA (ranking up to 4 out of 6 schools)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.50 0.28 1.00
School 3 1.00 2.08 0.14 0.00 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.02 0.57 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.29 0.12 0.00 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.52 0.50 1.00
School 5 2.00 0.56 0.07 0.00 2.02 0.31 0.96 2.01 0.29 1.00
School 6 2.50 0.23 0.12 0.00 2.53 0.45 0.96 2.51 0.43 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 9.40 0.64 0.00 2.97 2.29 0.96 3.05 2.26 1.00
Distance 1.00 0.71 0.08 0.08 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.01 0.20 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-Telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 100% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Panel B. DA with application cost (constant marginal cost c  106)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.41 0.09 0.88 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.49 0.28 1.00
School 3 1.00 0.57 0.16 0.23 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.00 0.53 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.17 0.15 0.37 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.49 0.48 1.00
School 5 2.00 1.74 0.11 0.32 2.02 0.30 0.96 1.99 0.29 1.00
School 6 2.50 2.24 0.14 0.50 2.54 0.45 0.96 2.48 0.41 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 2.19 0.72 0.77 2.96 2.29 0.96 3.16 2.29 1.00
Distance 1.00 0.93 0.09 0.88 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.00 0.30 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-Telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 37% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Notes: This table reports Monte Carlo results from estimating students’ preferences under different set of identifying
assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling; (ii) stability; (iii) stability and undominated strategies. 500 Monte Carlo samples
of school choice data are simulated under two data generating processes for an economy in which 500 students compete
for admission into 6 schools: a constrained/truncated DA where students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools out of 6
(Panel A); an unconstrained DA where students can rank as many schools as they wish, but incur a constant marginal
cost c  106 for including an extra school in their ROL beyond the first choice (Panel B). Under assumptions (i) and (ii),
student preferences are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Under assumption (iii), they are estimated using
Andrews and Shi (2013)’s method of moment (in)equalities. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters. The mean
and standard deviation (SD) of point estimates across the Monte Carlo samples are reported in columns 2, 5 and 8, and in
columns 3, 6 and 9, respectively. Columns 4, 7 and 10 report the coverage probabilities (CP) for the 95 percent confidence
intervals. The confidence intervals in models (i) and (ii) are the Wald-type confidence intervals obtained from the inverse of
the Hessian matrix. The marginal confidence intervals in model (iii) are computed using the method proposed by Bugni et
al. (2017). Truth-telling is tested against stability by constructing a Hausman-type test statistic from the estimates of both
approaches. Stability is tested against undominated strategies by checking if the identified set of the moment (in)equality
model is empty, using the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015). See Appendix C for details on the Monte Carlo simulations.
unconstrained DA where the marginal application cost is set equal to 106.
In both settings, the WTT-based estimator (βˆTT ) is severely biased (see column 2).
Particularly in Panel A, we note that low-ability students’ valuation of the most popular
schools tends to be underestimated (e.g., School 6), because such schools are more likely
to be omitted from low-priority students’ ROLs due to their low admission probabilities.
This bias is also present among small schools (e.g., Schools 3 and 4), which are often left
out of ROLs because their cutoffs tend to be higher than those of equally desirable but
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larger schools.
By contrast, the average of the stability-based estimates (βˆST ) is reasonably close to
the true parameter values. Its standard deviations, however, are larger than those ob-
tained under WTT. This efficiency loss is a direct consequence of restricting the choice
sets to feasible schools and of ignoring the information content of ROLs.24 Under the as-
sumption that the matching outcome is stable, the Hausman test presented in Section 2.4
strongly rejects truth-telling in our simulations.
The estimator from the moment (in)equalities approach (βˆMEI), which incorporates
the over-identifying information contained in students’ ROLs, is also consistent (col-
umn 8). Compared with using stability alone, the inclusion of moment inequalities is
informative to the extent that these inequalities define sufficiently tight bounds for the
probability of a preference ordering over some pairs of schools. This is more likely when
the constraint on the length of ROLs is mild and/or when the cost of ranking an extra
school is low, since these situations increase the chances of observing subsets of schools be-
ing ranked by a large fraction of students. A limitation of this approach, however, is that
the currently available methods for conducting inference based on moment (in)equality
models are typically conservative. As a result, the 95 percent marginal confidence inter-
vals based on moment (in)equalities cover the true values too often (coverage probability,
or CP, is close to one). Besides, the intervals tend to be wider than those obtained using
moment equalities alone, although the point estimates are closer to the true parameter
values.
4 School Choice in Paris
Since 2008, the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris) assigns students to public
high schools based on a version of the school-proposing DA called AFFELNET (Hiller
and Tercieux, 2014). At the district level, student priority indices are not school-specific
(as detailed below) and the mechanism is equivalent to a serial dictatorship.
Towards the end of the Spring term, final-year middle school students who are ad-
mitted to the upper secondary academic track (Seconde Ge´ne´rale et Technologique)25
24We further quantify the efficiency loss in Appendix C.5 in simulations where students are strictly
truth-telling. In this case, the WTT-based estimator is consistent and efficient, while the stability-based
estimator is still consistent but inefficient.
25In the French educational system, students are tracked at the end of the final year of colle`ge (equiv-
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are requested to submit a ROL of up to 8 public high schools to the Paris Education
Authority. Students’ priority indices are determined as follows:
(i) Students’ academic performance during the last year of middle school is graded on
a scale of 400 to 600 points.
(ii) Paris is divided into four districts. Students receive a “district” bonus of 600 points
for each school in their list that is located in their home district, and no bonus for
the others. Therefore, students applying to a school in their home district have full
priority over out-of-district applicants to the same school.
(iii) Low-income students are awarded an additional bonus of 300 points. As a result,
these students are given full priority over all other students from the same district.26
The DA algorithm is run at the end of the academic year to determine school as-
signment for the following academic year. Unassigned students can participate in a
supplementary round of admissions by submitting a new ROL of schools among those
with remaining seats, the assignment mechanism being the same as for the main round.
Note that the mechanism would be strategy-proof if there were no constraints on
the length of ROLs. Nonetheless, under the current mechanism, it is still a dominated
strategy to submit a ROL that is not a partial order of true preferences (Proposition 2).
4.1 Data
For our empirical analysis, we use data from Paris’ Southern District (Sud) and study
the choices of 1,590 within-district middle school students who applied for admission to
the district’s 11 public high schools for the academic year starting in 2013. Owing to the
600-point “district” bonus, this district is essentially an independent market.27
Along with information on socio-demographic characteristics and home addresses, our
data contain all the relevant variables to replicate the matching outcome, including the
schools’ capacities, the students’ ROLs of schools, and their priority indices (converted
into percentiles between 0 and 1). Individual examination results for the Diploˆme national
alent to middle school), at the age of 15, into vocational or academic upper secondary education.
26The low-income status is conditional on a student applying for and being granted the means-tested
low-income financial aid in the last year of middle school. A family with two children would be eligible
for this financial aid in 2013 if its taxable income was below 17,155 euros. The aid ranges from 135 to
665 euros per year.
27Out-of-district applicants could affect the availability of school seats in the supplementary round,
but this is of little concern since, in the district, only 22 students out of 1,590 were unassigned at the end
of the main round (for the comparison of assigned and unassigned students, see Appendix Table E4).
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du brevet (DNB)—a national exam that all students take at the end of middle school—are
used to construct different measures of academic ability (math, French, and composite
score), which are normalized as percentiles between 0 and 1.28 Table 3 reports students’
characteristics, choices, and admission outcomes. Almost half of the students are of high
socioeconomic status (SES), while 15 percent receive the low-income bonus. 99 percent
are assigned to a within-district school in the main admission round, but only half obtain
their first choice. Compared to their assigned schools, applicants’ first-choice schools tend
to have students of higher ability and more privileged background.
More detailed summary statistics for the 11 academic-track high schools in the district
are presented in Table 4. Columns 1–4 show that there is a high degree of stratification
among schools, both in terms of the average ability of students enrolled in 2012 and of
their social background (measured by the fraction of high SES students). Columns 5–8
report a number of outcomes from the 2013 round of assignment. The district’s total
capacity (1,692 seats) is unevenly distributed across schools: the smallest school has
62 seats while the largest has 251. School cutoffs in 2013 are strongly correlated with
the different measures of school quality, albeit not perfectly. The last column shows the
fraction of ROLs in which each school appears. The least popular three schools are ranked
by less than 24 percent of students, and two of them remain under-subscribed (Schools 1
and 3) and thus have cutoffs equal to zero. Consistent with our Monte Carlo results, we
note that smaller schools are omitted by more students, even if they are of high quality.
Likewise, a sizeable fraction of students (20 percent) do not rank the best-performing
school (School 11) in their lists.
More detailed statistics on enrollment outcomes (see Appendix Table E4) indicate a
high level of compliance with the matching outcome, as 96 percent of assigned students
attend the school they were matched with. Very few students (around 1 percent) attend
a public high school different from their assignment school, and less than 3 percent opt
out from the public school system to enroll in a private school.
28See Appendix B for a detailed description of the data sources. A map of the district is provided in
Appendix Figure E5.
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Table 3: High School Applicants in the Southern District of Paris: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Panel A. Student characteristics
Age 15.0 0.4 13 17 1,590
Female 0.51 0.50 0 1 1,590
French score 0.56 0.25 0.00 1.00 1,590
Math score 0.54 0.24 0.01 1.00 1,590
Composite score 0.55 0.21 0.02 0.99 1,590
High SES 0.48 0.50 0 1 1,590
With low-income bonus 0.15 0.36 0 1 1,590
Panel B. Choices and outcomes
Number of choices within district 6.6 1.3 1 8 1,590
Assigned to a within-district school 0.99 0.12 0 1 1,590
Assigned to first choice school 0.56 0.50 0 1 1,590
Panel C. Attributes of first choice school
Distance (km) 1.52 0.93 0.01 6.94 1,590
Mean student French score 0.62 0.11 0.32 0.75 1,590
Mean student math score 0.61 0.13 0.27 0.78 1,590
Mean student composite score 0.61 0.12 0.31 0.77 1,590
Fraction high SES in school 0.53 0.15 0.15 0.71 1,590
Panel D. Attributes of assigned school
Distance (km) 1.55 0.89 0.06 6.94 1,568
Mean student French score 0.56 0.12 0.32 0.75 1,568
Mean student math score 0.54 0.14 0.27 0.78 1,568
Mean student composite score 0.55 0.13 0.31 0.77 1,568
Fraction high SES in school 0.48 0.15 0.15 0.71 1,568
Notes: This table provides summary statistics on the choices of middle school students from the Southern District of
Paris who applied for admission to the district’s 11 public high schools for the academic year starting in 2013, based on
administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris). All scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme
national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured in percentiles and normalized to be in r0, 1s. The composite
score is the average of the scores in French and math. The correlation coefficient between French and math scores is 0.50.
School attributes, except distance, are measured by the average characteristics of students enrolled in each school in the
previous year (2012).
Table 4: High Schools in the Southern District of Paris: Summary Statistics
School attributes (2012) Assignment outcomes (2013)
Mean
French
score
Mean
math
score
Mean
composite
score
Fraction
high SES
students
Capacity Count
Admission
cutoffs
Fraction
ROLs
ranking it
School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
School 1 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.15 72 19 0.000 0.22
School 2 0.36 0.27 0.32 0.17 62 62 0.015 0.23
School 3 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.16 67 36 0.000 0.14
School 4 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.46 140 140 0.001 0.59
School 5 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.47 240 240 0.042 0.83
School 6 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.32 171 171 0.069 0.71
School 7 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.56 251 251 0.373 0.91
School 8 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.30 91 91 0.239 0.39
School 9 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.66 148 148 0.563 0.83
School 10 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.49 237 237 0.505 0.92
School 11 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.71 173 173 0.705 0.80
Notes: This tables provides summary statistics on the attributes of high schools in the Southern District of Paris and on
the outcomes of the 2013 assignment round, based on administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de
Paris). School attributes in 2012 are measured by the average characteristics of the schools’ enrolled students in 2012–2013.
All scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured in percentiles
and normalized to be in r0, 1s. The composite score is the average of the scores in French and math. The correlation
coefficient between school-average math and French scores is 0.97.
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4.2 Evaluating Identifying Assumptions: Reduced-Form Evi-
dence
We analyze applicants’ ranking behavior by investigating whether students are less likely
to rank schools at which they might expect low admission probabilities. As illustrated in
the “skipping the impossible” Example 1 (Section 1.2), this type of behavior would be
inconsistent with the (weakly) truth-telling assumption.
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Figure 2: Fraction of Students Ranking Each of the Four Most Selective Schools in the
Southern District of Paris, by Distance to School Cutoff
Notes: The results are calculated with administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris) for
students who applied to the 11 high schools of Paris’s Southern District for the academic year starting in 2013. The figure
shows the ranking behavior of students as a function of the distance (using the original scale in points) between each
school’s cutoff and students’ priority index. The sample is restricted to students with a priority index within 50 and +50
points of the cutoffs and, for each school, students are grouped into distance-to-cutoff bins of 10-point width. Bins with
less than 10 observations are excluded. Each point represents the fraction of students in a given bin who rank the school in
their list. The dotted lines show the 95 percent confidence interval. Low-income students are not included in the samples
because the low-income bonus of 300 points places them well above the cutoffs.
Figure 2 focuses on the district’s four most selective schools (as measured by their
cutoffs). For each school separately, we plot the fraction of students who rank it in
their ROL as a function of their distance to the school cutoff, which is computed as the
difference (using the original scale in points) between the student’s priority index and
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the cutoff.29 The observed pattern indicates that almost all students with a priority
index above a school’s cutoff include that school in their list, whereas the fraction of
students ranking the school decreases rapidly when the priority index falls below the
cutoff. Irrespective of strategic considerations, one might expect high priority students
to have a stronger preference for the most selective schools—since priorities are positively
correlated with academic performance—and hence to rank them more often. However,
the kink around the cutoffs is consistent with some students omitting the most selective
schools from their list because they expect low admission probabilities. Such a pattern
is difficult to be reconciled with the truth-telling assumption.
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Figure 3: School Cutoffs in 2012 and 2013
Notes: The results are calculated with administrative data from the Paris Education Authority (Rectorat de Paris). The
11 schools of the Southern district are represented by dots, with the cutoff in 2013 on the Y-axis and the cutoff in 2012 on
the X-axis. The dashed line denotes the 45-degree line.
The reduced-form evidence in Figure 2 suggests that students’ ranking behavior could
be influenced by their expected admission probabilities. At the time of application,
students know their academic grades and low-income status but not their priority ranking
nor the ex post cutoffs.30 They can, however, gather information on past year cutoffs,
which may help them assess their admission probabilities. While we do not have direct
29We restrict the sample to students whose score falls between 50 and  50 points of each school’s
cutoff (using the original scale). Due to the low-income bonus of 300 points, low-income students’ priority
indices are always well above the cutoffs. They are therefore not considered in the analysis.
30This uncertainty in both priority ranking and cutoffs may explain why some students find it optimal
to rank multiple schools, given that the cost of ranking up to 8 choices is arguably negligible.
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information on students’ beliefs, Figure 3 shows that the current year (2013) cutoffs are
similar those observed in the previous year (2012). This lends support to the assumption
that students have some ability to predict their admission probabilities at the different
schools.31 Although not a necessary condition for the matching outcome to be stable, this
feature makes the stability assumption more likely to be satisfied in the Parisian setting.
4.3 Estimation and Test Results
We assume that student i’s utility from attending school s can be represented by the
following random utility model:
ui,s  αs  di,s   Z 1i,sγ   λi,s, s  1, . . . , 11; (11)
where αs is the school fixed effect, di,s is the distance to school s from i’s place of residence,
and Zi,s is a vector of student-school-specific observables. As observed heterogeneity, Zi,s
includes two variables that capture potential non-linearities in the disutility of distance
and control for potential behavioral biases towards certain schools: “closest school” is a
dummy variable equal to one if s is the closest to student i among all 11 schools; “high
school co-located with middle school” is another dummy that equals one if high school s
and the student’s middle school are co-located at the same address.32 To account for
students’ heterogeneous valuation of school quality, interactions between student scores
and school scores are introduced separately for French and math, as well as an interaction
between own SES and the fraction of high SES students in the school. These school
attributes are measured among the entering class of 2012, whereas our focus is on students
applying for admission in 2013. We normalize the variables in Zi,s so that each school’s
fixed effect can be interpreted as the mean valuation, relative to School 1, of a non-high-
SES student who has median scores in both French and math, whose middle school is
not co-located with that high school, and for whom the high school is not the closest to
her residence.
The idiosyncratic error term i,s is assumed to be an i.i.d. type-I extreme value, and
the variance of unobserved heterogeneity is λ2 multiplied by the variance of i,s. The
effect of distance is normalized to 1, and, therefore, the fixed effects and γ are all
31The comparison could not be performed for earlier years due to changes in the computation of the
priority index and small changes in the set of available schools.
32There are five such high schools in the district.
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measured in terms of willingness to travel. As a usual position normalization, α1  0.
We do not consider outside options because of students’ almost perfect compliance with
the matching outcome from the centralized mechanism.
Using the same procedures as in the Monte Carlo simulations (described in Ap-
pendix C), we obtain the results summarized in Table 5, where each column reports
estimates under a given set of identifying assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling (column 1);
(ii) stability (column 2); and (iii) stability with undominated strategies (column 3).33
The results show clearly that the WTT-based estimates (column 1) are rather different
from the others. More specifically, a downward bias is apparent when a popular school is
not ranked by many students, especially for Schools 8 and 11. School 8, which is omitted
by 61 percent of students, is assumed under the WTT assumption to be less desirable than
all the schools included in the ROL, which leads to a lower estimated fixed effect than
under the stability assumption. Similarly, there is a noticeable difference in the quality
estimate of School 11, which is one of the most popular schools. This under-estimation
is mitigated when the model is estimated under the other two sets of assumptions.
Provided that the model is correctly specified, the Hausman test rejects truth-telling
in favor of stability (p-value   0.01); the test based on moment (in)equalities does not
reject the null hypothesis that stability is consistent with undominated strategies at a
5 percent significance level.
The results show that “closest school” has no significant effect, but students signif-
icantly prefer co-located schools. Compared with low-score students, those with high
French (math) scores have a stronger preference for schools with higher French (math)
scores. Moreover, high SES students prefer schools that have admitted a larger fraction
of high SES students in the previous year (2012).
It is worth noting that the WTT-based estimates of the covariates (Panel B) are not
33For the estimates reported in column 3, we rely on the method of moment (in)equalities where
inequalities are constructed as described in Section 2.5. Determined by our selection of Zi,s, we interact
French score, math score, and distances to Schools 1 and 2 with the conditional moments. Although one
could use more variables, e.g., SES status and distance to other schools, they provide little additional
variation. In principle, the assumption of undominated strategies alone implies partial identification
(see Section 2.5.1). Because stability is not rejected by our test, we do not present results based on
this approach (available upon request). It should be noted, however, that the marginal confidence
intervals that we obtain for each parameter using only moment inequalities turn out to be very wide
in our empirical setting, and hence are relatively uninformative. The possible reasons are that the
derived bounds for the probability of a preference ordering over the different pairs of schools (55 moment
inequalities) are fairly wide, and that the available methods to conduct inference based on moment
inequalities are typically conservative.
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Table 5: Estimation Results under Different Sets of Identifying Assumptions
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of the
matching outcome
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. School fixed effects
School 2 0.71 1.46 1.21
[1.17, 0.24] [0.64, 2.28] [0.14, 2.29]
School 3 2.12 1.03 0.84
[2.66, 1.58] [0.19, 1.86] [0.56, 2.01]
School 4 3.31 2.91 2.90
[2.75, 3.86] [2.07, 3.76] [2.36, 3.39]
School 5 5.13 4.16 4.16
[4.41, 5.84] [3.22, 5.10] [3.71, 4.49]
School 6 4.87 4.24 4.30
[4.21, 5.54] [3.29, 5.18] [3.73, 4.82]
School 7 7.32 6.81 6.24
[6.47, 8.18] [5.65, 7.98] [5.76, 7.28]
School 8 1.59 4.46 4.27
[1.10, 2.08] [3.46, 5.47] [2.98, 5.26]
School 9 6.84 7.77 6.57
[6.07, 7.61] [6.55, 8.99] [5.84, 7.26]
School 10 7.84 7.25 6.44
[6.94, 8.75] [6.01, 8.49] [5.87, 7.05]
School 11 5.35 7.28 5.61
[4.62, 6.08] [6.06, 8.51] [4.98, 7.33]
Panel B. Covariates
Closest school 0.37 0.19 0.15
[0.63, 0.11] [0.47, 0.10] [0.75, 0.57]
High school co-located 2.54 1.76 1.54
with middle school [2.02, 3.07] [1.19, 2.32] [0.17, 3.12]
Student French score [10] 0.20 0.18 0.23
 school French score [10] [0.16, 0.23] [0.13, 0.24] [0.10, 0.35]
Student math score [10] 0.30 0.27 0.30
 school math score [10] [0.26, 0.34] [0.21, 0.32] [0.18, 0.40]
High SES 6.79 4.92 8.12
 fraction high SES in school [5.62, 7.97] [3.31, 6.54] [4.18, 12.55]
Scaling parameter 3.09 1.33 1.50
[2.79, 3.38] [1.16, 1.50] [1.20, 1.64]
Number of students 1,590 1,568 1,590
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the model described by Equation (11) for the Southern District of Paris, with the
coefficient on distance being normalized to 1. The point estimates in columns 1 and 2 are based on maximum likelihood
whereas those in column 3 are based on moment equalities and inequalities, with 95 percent confidence intervals indicated
in parentheses.
Model selection tests: A Hausman test, testing (1) against (2) reject the null hypothesis that the truth-telling assumption
is satisfied in favor of stability (p-value   0.01); a test based on moment equalities and inequalities does not reject the null
hypothesis that stability is consistent with undominated strategies at the 95 percent level.
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markedly different from the stability-based estimates. However, one cannot conclude that
the truth-telling assumption produces reasonable results, as the estimates of fixed effects
have shown. Moreover, we emphasize in the next section the relatively poor fit of the
WTT-based estimates to the data.
4.4 Goodness of Fit
On three sets of outcomes (cutoffs, assignment, and revealed preferences), we compare
the observed values to those predicted using the estimates from Table 5. These tests
show that the stability-based estimates fit the data well, as opposed to those based on
WTT, whose predictions are further away from the observed outcomes (see Appendix D
for computational details).
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Figure 4: Goodness of Fit: Observed vs. Simulated Cutoffs
Notes: This figure compares the cutoffs observed for the 11 high schools of the Southern District of Paris in 2013, to those
simulated under different sets of identifying assumptions as in Table 5. The reported values for the simulated cutoffs are
averaged over 300 simulated samples. See Appendix D for details.
In particular, the results show clearly that estimates based on stability (with or with-
out undominated strategies) predict cutoffs close to the observed ones (see Figure 4 and
Appendix Table D3). By contrast, the WTT-based estimates substantially under-predict
the cutoffs of the most popular schools.
Panel A of Table 6 compares students’ predicted assignment to the observed one,
using 300 simulated samples. The stability-based estimates estimates have between 33
and 38 percent successful prediction rates, whereas the WTT-based estimates accurately
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Table 6: Goodness-of-Fit Measures Based on Different Sets of Identifying Assumptions
Estimates from
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of
the matching
outcome
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Simulated vs. observed assignment (300 simulated samples)
Mean predicted fraction of students 0.220 0.383 0.326
assigned to observed assignment (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Panel B. Predicted vs. observed partial preference order
Predicting observed ordering 0.553 0.615 0.595
of top two choices
Predicting observed ordering 0.012 0.025 0.022
of all submitted choices
Notes: This table reports two sets of goodness-of-fit measures comparing the observed outcomes to those predicted under
the different sets of identifying assumptions as in Table 5, for the high school assignment of students in the Southern
District of Paris. Panel A compares students’ observed assignment with their predicted assignment in 300 simulated
samples. In all simulations, we vary only the utility shocks, which are kept common across columns 1–3 (see Appendix D
for details). Predicted and observed assignments are compared by computing the average predicted fraction of students
who are assigned to their observed assignment school, with standard deviations across the simulation samples reported in
parentheses; in other words, this is the average fraction of times each student is assigned to her observed assignment in
the 300 simulated samples. Panel B uses two measures to compare students’ observed partial preference order (revealed by
their submitted ROL) with the prediction, among students who rank at least two schools: (i) mean predicted probability of
the observed ordering of students’ top two choices, which is averaged across students; and (ii) mean predicted probability
of the observed ordering of students’ full list of choices. Due to the logit specification, those probabilities can be calculated
without simulation.
predict only 22 percent of assignments.
Panel B calculates the predicted probability that students have their observed partial
preference order (revealed by their submitted ROL), which can be calculated without
simulation due to the logit specification. The observed ordering of students’ top two
choices has a mean predicted probability of between 60 and 62 percent when using the
stability-based estimates, which is higher than the 55 percent achieved by the WTT-
based estimates. We next consider the observed ordering of students’ full list of choices.
Again, the stability-based estimates outperform the WTT-based estimates, with an av-
erage predicted probability between 2.2 and 2.5 percent for the former vs. 1.2 percent
for the latter. The predictive performance of the stability-based estimates along the two
measures reported in Panel B is noteworthy given that the prediction is partly out of
sample.34
34In the data, 54 percent of students ranked at least one infeasible school among their top two choices
(34 percent ranked exactly one infeasible school, while 20 percent ranked exactly two). The average
fraction of infeasible schools among all submitted choices is 30 percent.
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5 Summary and Discussion
In this section, we summarize our results. In centralized school choice and colleges ad-
missions where students are strictly ranked by some priority index, we clarify when each
approach is more appropriate for empirical analysis. We also discuss whether the results
can be extended to the school-proposing DA, to the case with non-equilibrium behavior,
and to settings beyond school choice and college admissions.
5.1 Choosing among the Approaches: A Summary
In the estimation of preferences based on real-life data from centralized school choice and
college admissions, there are a number of practical considerations that should be taken
into account. Recall that we focus on the strict-priority setting in which students are
ranked based on strict priority indices that are ex ante privately known. Building on the
results from our theoretical and empirical analyses, this section emphasizes some of the
key market features that deserve careful examination when one decides which approach
to use in a given context.
The Nesting Structure of Identifying Assumptions. Our theoretical framework
makes clear that estimating preferences from school choice and college admissions data in-
volves choosing among alternative identifying assumptions. In the strict-priority setting,
the candidate assumptions follow a nesting structure, as depicted in Figure 5.
Truth-telling is the first natural candidate identifying assumption because of DA’s
strategy-proofness. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, strict truth-telling (students
truthfully rank all schools) is the unique equilibrium of the game under DA, only if stu-
dents are able to rank all schools at no cost and face sufficient uncertainty (Proposition 1
in Section 1.2). In real-life data, students seldom rank all schools, which calls for a
weaker version of the truth-telling assumption. As clarified in the theoretical analysis,
weak truth-telling (students truthfully rank their most preferred schools and omit some
least preferred ones) does not follow directly from the DA mechanism being strategy-
proof, as it requires additional restrictive assumptions such as the length of ROLs being
independent of preferences.
Stability is an even weaker assumption on students’ behavior, while still allowing for
the identification of preferences. It states that every student is assigned to her favorite ex
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Figure 5: Nesting Structure of Identifying Assumptions
Notes: This figure shows the nesting structure of the identifying assumptions that can be used to analyze data generated
by DA and its variants in the strict-priority setting. The numbered areas correspond to different combinations of iden-
tifying assumptions: (1) strict truth-telling; (2) weak truth-telling and stability; (3) weak truth-telling without stability;
(4) stability and undominated strategies; (5) stability without undominated strategies; (6) undominated strategies without
stability.
post feasible school, and is always satisfied when students are strictly truth-telling. Al-
though it is not guaranteed in all Bayesian Nash equilibria, even when students are weakly
truth-telling, it is asymptotically satisfied when the economy grows large (Proposition 4).
The third candidate identifying assumption for preference estimation is that students
do not play dominated strategies (Proposition 2), so that submitted ROLs reveal students’
partial preference orders of schools. Weak truth-telling is a special case of this more
general assumption, whereas stability may hold even if some students play dominated
strategies.
The Choice of Empirical Approaches and Tests. When choosing among the can-
didate identifying assumptions, consideration should be given to the particular features
of the problem under study, as well as the available data. For each assumption, Table 7
summarizes the features making it more plausible, the required data, and the appropriate
estimation methods and tests.
Truth-telling is more likely to be satisfied when students can rank as many schools as
they wish at no cost, and are subject to large uncertainty about each school’s exact rank-
ing of students. Conditional on students’ submitted ROLs being observed, preferences
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Table 7: Summary of Empirical Approaches and Tests
Identifying
assumption
What makes the assumption more
plausible?
Required
data
Estimation
method
Testing
Weak
Truth-Telling:
Schools in a
submitted ROL are
ranked in true
preference order and
omitted ones are less
preferred.
(1) No cost of ranking more schools, e.g., no
restriction on the length of submitted ROL
and choice set not being too large. (2) At
the time of application, each student knows
her own priority index but not others’, and
the distribution of priority indices has a
large variance.
Submitted ROLs MLE/GMM
H0: Both weak
truth-telling and
stability are satisfied;
H1: Only stability is
satisfied.
This can be tested,
e.g., using the
Hausman (1978) or
Hansen (1982) tests,
under the condition
that (almost)
everyone is assigned.
Stability:
Every student is
assigned to her
favorite feasible
school.
Stability is satisfied if truth-telling holds and
(almost) everyone is assigned. Otherwise, it
is more likely to be true when (1) market is
large (many students, big schools); (2)
students are less constrained when applying
to more schools; (3) students face limited
uncertainty about how schools rank them at
the time of application; (4) students know
more about others’ preferences; or (5)
cutoffs are easy to predict.
Matching outcome,
school capacities,
priority indices
MLE/GMM
Undominated
strategies:
Submitted ROLs are
true partial preference
orders.
(1) No “safety school” so that “irrelevancy
at the bottom” of one’s ROL is less likely.
(2) No “impossible school” so that students
do not rank impossible school arbitrarily.
Submitted ROLs
Moment
inequalities
(partial
identification)
H0: Both stability
and undominated
strategies are satisfied
H1: Only
undominated
strategies is satisfied
This can be tested,
e.g., with the
approach in Bugni et
al. (2015), assuming
that students never
play dominated
strategies.
Stability and
Undominated
strategies:
Every student is
assigned to her
favorite feasible
school, and submitted
ROLs are true partial
preference orders.
See the conditions laid out separately for
stability and undominated strategies
Submitted ROLs,
matching outcome,
school capacities,
priority indices
Moment
equalities  
moment
inequalities
Notes: This table describes the empirical approaches and tests that can be used to analyze data generated by DA and its
variants in the strict-priority setting.
can be estimated using either MLE or GMM. The choice between weak truth-telling and
strict truth-telling depends on whether students rank all schools (Section 2.2) and on the
importance of outside options (Appendix A.3).
When students face some cost of ranking more schools (e.g., if the length of ROLs
is restricted), stability can be a more plausible assumption than truth-telling. This
assumption is more likely to hold when the market is larger (i.e., many students and many
seats per school), when students are less constrained in applying to multiple schools (e.g.,
longer ROLs), when they are less uncertain about each school’s ranking of all students
at the time of application, the more they know about others’ preferences, or when it is
easier for them to predict school cutoffs (Proposition 5). Our Monte Carlo simulations
additionally provide numerical evidence suggesting that stability is a plausible assumption
even when students face non-negligible application costs (Appendix C.3).
Estimating preferences under the stability assumption requires knowledge of the match-
ing outcome, the school capacities and the students’ priority indices, but has the advan-
tage of not requiring data on submitted ROLs.
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Weak truth-telling does not always imply stability, but it does if (almost) all students
are assigned to a school (Proposition 3). In this case, weak truth-telling can be tested
against stability using the Hausman (1978) and Hansen (1982) tests.
If it is believed that neither truth-telling nor stability assumptions are likely to be
satisfied in the context being studied, preferences can be still be partially identified under
the assumption that students do not play dominated strategies. This assumption will be
more plausible if no school is either “safe” or “impossible” for students, making it less
likely that students rank some schools in an arbitrary manner. Submitted ROLs can then
be used to form conditional moment inequalities that allow for the partial identification
of preferences.
When the conditions for both stability and undominated-strategies assumptions are
jointly satisfied, the moment inequalities from the latter assumption provide over-identifying
information that can be used in combination with the stability assumption to estimate
preferences based on all of the available data (ROLs, matching outcome, school capaci-
ties, and priority indices). Additionally, the stability assumption can be tested against
the undominated-strategies assumption using the specification test in Bugni et al. (2015).
5.2 Discussion and Extension
The School-Proposing DA. Our main results can be extended to the school-proposing
DA, which is also commonly used in practice (see Table 1). Under this mechanism, schools
“propose” to students following the order of student priority indices. Proposition 2 no
longer holds; that is, students might have incentives not to report a true partial preference
order (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). Nonetheless, the asymptotic stability result (Propo-
sition 4) still holds, as its proof does not rely on Proposition 2. Indeed, it is known that
the matching outcome can be stable in Nash equilibrium under the school-proposing DA
(Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
To summarize, if the matching market under the school-proposing DA has features
making the matching outcome stable (see Table 7), we can formulate identification and
estimation of student preferences based on stability. However, the truth-telling assump-
tion no longer has theoretical support, as the school-proposing DA is not strategy-proof
for students (Roth, 1982). Additionally, the approach relying on undominated strategies
does not apply, since there are no dominated strategies under this mechanism (Haeringer
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and Klijn, 2009).
Non-Equilibrium Strategies. We have thus far focused on the case in which everyone
plays an equilibrium strategy with a common prior, an assumption that one may want
to relax. More realistically, some students could have different information and make
mistakes when strategizing.35
Indeed, a growing number of studies find that strategic mistakes are not uncommon
even in strategy-proof environments. Laboratory experiments have shown that a sig-
nificant fraction of subjects do not report their preferences truthfully in strategy-proof
mechanisms (Chen and So¨nmez, 2006). More relevantly, mistakes occur in high-stake real-
world contexts, e.g., the admissions to Israeli graduate programs in psychology (Hassidim,
Romm and Shorrer, 2016), the medical resident match in the U.S. (Rees-Jones, 2016),
and the Australian college admissions (Artemov et al., 2017). Without estimating prefer-
ences, these studies show that a non-negligible fraction of participants make unambiguous
mistakes in their ROLs.
However, the vast majority of these mistakes are not payoff relevant. In other words,
although some students play dominated strategies, the matching outcome is still close
to stable—which corresponds to area 5 in Figure 5. Based on these observations, the
results in Artemov et al. (2017) imply that, as identifying restrictions, assuming stability
can be more robust and more plausible than the assumption of undominated strategies.
Beyond School Choice and College Admissions. Although the analysis has fo-
cused on school choice and college admissions, our results can apply to certain assign-
ment/matching procedures based on DA. Let us call agents on the two sides “applicants”
and “recruiters,” respectively. The key requirement is that at the time of applying,
applicants have sufficiently precise information on how recruiters rank them and that
researchers have information on how recruiters exactly rank applicants.36 Examples in-
clude teacher assignment to public schools in France (Terrier, 2014; Combe, Tercieux and
Terrier, 2016) and the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme matching medical school
35Under some non-DA mechanisms, Calsamiglia et al. (2014) and He (2015) consider the possibility
that students make mistakes when submitting ROLs.
36When researchers have no information on how either side ranks the other, we are in the classic setting
of two-sided matching, where additional assumptions are often needed for identification and estimation
(Chiappori and Salanie´, 2016).
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graduates to training programs (Irving, 2011), which are both centralized. The estimation
approaches discussed in Section 2 could be implemented in these settings.
6 Conclusion
We present novel approaches to estimating student preferences with school choice or col-
lege admissions data generated by the popular Deferred Acceptance mechanism when
applicants are ranked strictly by some ex-ante known priority index. We provide theoret-
ical and empirical evidence showing that, in this commonly observed setting, it is rather
restrictive to assume that students truthfully rank schools when applying for admission.
Instead, stability (or justified-envy-freeness) of the matching outcome provides rich iden-
tifying information, while being a weaker assumption on students’ behavior. Assuming
that students do not play dominated strategies, we also discuss methods with moment
inequalities, which can be useful whether stability is satisfied or not. A series of tests are
proposed to guide the selection of the appropriate approach.
The estimation and testing methods are illustrated with Monte Carlo simulations.
When applied to school choice data from Paris, our results are more consistent with sta-
bility than with truth-telling. Reduced-form evidence on ranking behavior suggests that
some students omit the most selective schools from their list because of low admission
probabilities. Our proposed tests reject truth-telling but not stability and, compared with
our preferred estimates based on stability (with or without moment inequalities from un-
dominated strategies), assuming truth-telling leads to an under-estimation of preferences
for popular or small schools. Moreover, the stability-based estimators outperform the
truth-telling-based estimator in predicting matching outcomes and student preferences.
Our approaches are applicable to many school choice and college admissions systems
around the world, as well as to other matching schemes such as teacher assignment in
France and medical matching in Scotland.
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A.1
Appendix A Proofs and Additional Results
Section A.1 collects the proofs and additional results for a finite economy, while those
related to asymptotics and the continuum economy are presented in Section A.2.
A.1 Finite Economy: Proofs from Sections 1.2 and 1.3
Proof of Proposition 1.
Without application cost, STT is a dominant-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982), so we only need to prove its uniqueness.
Suppose that a non-STT strategy, σ, is another equilibrium. Without loss of gener-
ality, let us assume σ is in pure strategy.
Since STT is a weakly dominant strategy, it implies that, for any i and any θi P ΘI1,
S¸
s1
ui,sas prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq ¥
S¸
s1
ui,sas pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq ,
in which both terms are non-negative given the assumptions on G. Moreover, σ being an
equilibrium means that, for any i:
S¸
s1
ui,s
»
as prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq dGpθiq ¤
S¸
s1
ui,s
»
as pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq dGpθiq.
We therefore must have that, for any i and any θi P ΘI1 except a measure-zero set of
θi,
S¸
s1
ui,sas prpuiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq 
S¸
s1
ui,sas pσpθiq, ei;σpθiq, eiq . (A.1)
Through the following claims, we then show that σ must be STT, i.e., σpθiq  rpuiq.
Claim 1 : σpθiq and rpuiq have the same top choice.
Proof of Claim 1 : Given the full support of G, there is a positive probability that
i’s priority indices at all schools are the highest among all students. In this event, i is
accepted by r1i (her most preferred school) when submitting rpuiq and accepted by the
top choice in σpθiq when submitting σpθiq. As preferences are strict, σpθiq must have r1i
as the top choice to have Equation (A.1) satisfied.
Claim 2 : σpθiq and rpuiq have the same top two choices.
Proof of Claim 2 : From Claim 1, we know that σpθiq and rpuiq agree on their top
choices. Given the full support of G, there is a positive probability that i’s type and
A.2
others’ types satisfy the following conditions: (i) i’s priority index is the lowest among
all students at school r1i ; (ii) i’s priority index is the highest among all students at all
other schools; and (iii) all other students have r1i as their most preferred school. In this
event, by Claim 1, all students rank r1i as top choice. Therefore, i is rejected by r
1
i , but
she is definitely accepted by her second choice. Because STT means she is accepted by
r2i , Equation (A.1) implies that σpθiq must also rank r2i as the second choice. This proves
the claim.
We can continue proving a series of similar claims that σpθiq and rpuiq must agree
on top S choices. In other words, σpθiq  rpuiq. This proves that there is no non-STT
equilibrium, and, therefore, STT is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
The sufficiency of the first statement is implied by the strategy-proofness of DA and
by DA producing a stable matching when everyone is STT. That is, STT is a dominant
strategy if C p|L|q  0 for all L, which always leads to stability.
To prove its necessity, it suffices to show that there is no dominant strategy when
C p|L|q ¡ 0 for some L P L.
If C p|L|q   8 for some L, we are in the case of the constrained/truncated DA, and
it is well known that there is no dominant strategy (see, e.g., Haeringer and Klijn, 2009).
Now suppose that 0   C p|L|q    8 for some L P L. If a strategy ranks fewer than
S schools with a positive probability, we know that it cannot be a dominant strategy for
the same reason as in the contrained/truncated DA. If a strategy does always rank all
schools, then it is weakly dominated by STT. We therefore need to show that STT is not
a dominant strategy for all student types, for which we can construct an example where
it is profitable for a student to drop some schools from her ROL to save application costs
for some profiles of ROLs submitted by other students.
Therefore, there is no dominant strategy when C p|L|q ¡ 0 for some L P L, and hence
stability cannot be an equilibrium outcome in dominant strategy.
The second statement is implied by Proposition 1 and that DA produces a stable
matching when everyone is STT. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that given a realized matching µˆ, there is a student-school pair pi, sq such
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that µˆpθiq  H, ui,s ¡ ui,µˆpθiq, and ei,s ¥ Pspµˆq. That is, i is not matched with her
favorite feasible school.
Since i is weakly truth-telling, she must have ranked all schools that are more preferred
to µˆpθiq, including s. The DA algorithm implies that i must have been rejected by s at
some round given that she is accepted by a lower-ranked school µˆpθiq. As i is rejected by
s in some round, the cutoff of s must be higher than ei,s. This contradiction rules out
the existence of such matchings.
(ii) Given the result in part (i), when every student who has at least one feasible
school is matched, everyone must be assigned to her favorite feasible school. Moreover,
unmatched students have no feasible school. Therefore, the matching is stable. 
A.2 Asymptotics: Proofs and Additional Results
We now present the proofs of results in the main text as well as some additional results
on the asymptotics and the continuum economy.
A.2.1 Matching and the DA Mechanism in the Continuum Economy
We follow Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2015) and Azevedo and Leshno (2016) to extend the
definitions of matching and DA to the continuum economy, E.
Similar to that in finite economies, a matching in E is a function µ : Θ Ñ S Y tHu,
such that (i) µ pθiq  s if student i is matched with s; (ii) µ pθiq  H if student i is
unmatched; (iii) µ1psq is measurable and is the set of students matched with s, while
Gpµ1psqq ¤ qs; and (iv) (open on the right) for any s P S, the set tθi P Θ : ui,µpθq ¤ ui,su
is open.
The last condition is imposed because in the continuum model it is always possible
to add a measure-zero set of students to a school without exceeding its capacity. This
would generate multiplicities of stable matchings that differ only in sets of measure zero.
Condition (iv) rules out such multiplicities. The intuition is that the condition implies
that a stable matching always allows an extra measure zero set of students into a school
when this can be done without compromising stability.
The DA algorithm works almost the same as in a finite economy. Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al. (2015) formally define the algorithm, and prove that it converges. A sketch of the
mechanism is as follows. At the first step, each student applies to her most preferred
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school. Every school tentatively admits up to its capacity from its applicants according
to its priority order, and rejects the rest if there are any. In general, each student who was
rejected in the previous step applies to her next preferred school. Each school considers
the set of students it has tentatively admitted and the new applicants. It tentatively
admits up to its capacity from these students in the order of its priority, and rejects
the rest. The process converges when the set of students that are rejected has zero
measure. Although this process might not complete in finite time, it converges in the
limit (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2015).
A.2.2 Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
We start with some auxiliary results that are useful to prove the propositions.
Similar to Azevedo and Leshno (2016), we define the convergence of tF pIquIPN to E
if qpIq converges to q and if GpIq converges to G in the weak-* topology.A.1 We similarly
define the convergence of tF pIq, σpIquIPN to pE, σ8q, additionally requiring the empirical
distributions of ROLs prescribed by σpIq in finite economies to converge to those in E
prescribed by σ8.
Lemma A1. For a sequence of random economies and equilibrium strategies tF pIq, σpIquIPN
satisfying Assumption 1, P pIq, the random cutoff associated with pF pIq, σpIqq, converges to
P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely.
Proof of Lemma A1.
First, we note that the sequence of random economies tF pIquIPN converges to E almost
surely. By construction, qpIq converges to q. Moreover, by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem,
the empirical distribution functions GpIq converge to G in the weak-* topology almost
surely. Therefore, we have that tF pIquIPN converges to E almost surely.
Second, we show that tF pIq, σpIquIPN converges to pE, σ8q almost surely. As σpIq
and σ8 map student types to ROLs of schools, tF pIq, σpIquIPN is a sequence of random
economies that are defined with ROLs. A student’s “type” is now characterized by
pLi, eiq P L r0, 1sS. Let M8 be the probability measure on the modified student types
in pE, σ8q. That is, for any Λ  L  r0, 1sS, M8pΛq  Gptθi P Θ | pσ8pθiq, eiq P Λuq.
A.1The weak-* convergence of measures is defined as
³
XdGˆpIq Ñ
³
XdG for every bounded continuous
function X : r0, 1s2S Ñ R, given a sequence of realized empirical distributions tGˆpIquIPN. This is also
known as narrow convergence or weak convergence.
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Similarly, M pIq is the empirical distribution function of the modified types in the random
economy tF pIq, σpIqu. We want to show that M pIq converges to M8 in the weak-* topology
almost surely.
Let X : L  r0, 1sS Ñ rx, xs  R be a bounded continuous function. We also define
M
pIq
σ8 the random probability measure on L  r0, 1sS when students play σ8 in random
economy F pIq. Because the strategy is fixed at σ8 for all I, by the same arguments
as above (i.e., the convergence of qpIq to q and the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem), M
pIq
σ8
converges to M8 almost surely.
Let ΘpIq  tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiqu. We have the following results:
»
XdM pIq 
»
XdM8

¤

»
XdM pIq 
»
XdM
pIq
σ8
 

»
XdM
pIq
σ8 
»
XdM8



»
XpσpIqpθiq, eiqdGpIq 
»
Xpσ8pθiq, eiqdGpIq
 

»
XdM
pIq
σ8 
»
XdM8



»
θiPΘpIq

XpσpIqpθiq, eiq Xpσp8qpθiq, eiq

dGpIq
 

»
XdM
pIq
σ8 
»
XdM8

¤px xqGpIqpΘpIqq  

»
XdM
pIq
σ8 
»
XdM8
 ,
where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality; the equalities are because of
the definitions of M pIq and M
pIq
σ8 and because XpσpIqpθiq, eiq  Xpσ8pθiq, eiq whenever
θi R ΘpIq; the last inequality comes from the boundedness of X.
Because limIÑ8GpΘpIqq  0 by Assumption 1 and GpIq converges to G almost surely,
limIÑ8G
pIqpΘpIqq  0 almost surely. Moreover, M pIqσ8 converges to M8 almost surely, and
thus the above inequalities implies
³
XdM pIq converges to
³
XdM8 almost surely. By the
Portmanteau theorem, M pIq converge to M8 in the weak-* topology almost surely.
This proves tF pIq, σpIquIPN converges to pE, σ8q almost surely. By Proposition 3 of
Azevedo and Leshno (2016), P pIq converges to P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely. 
Proposition A1. In a sequence of random economies and equilibrium strategies tF pIq, σpIquIPN
satisfying Assumption 1, µpE, σ8q  µ8 and thus σ8pθiq ranks µ8pθiq for all θi P Θ ex-
cept a measure-zero set of student types.
Proof of Proposition A1.
Suppose that the first statement in the proposition is not true, Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σ8qpθiq 
µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 and therefore P pE, σ8q  P8. Because there is a unique stable matching
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in E, which is the unique equilibrium outcome, by assumption, µpE,σ8q is not stable and
thus is not an equilibrium outcome.
Recall that P pE, σ8q, P8, µpE,σ8q, and µ8 are fixed constants, although their coun-
terparts in finite economies are random variables. Moreover, σpIq and σ8 are not random
variables either.
For some η, ξ ¡ 0, we define:
Θpη,ξq 
$''''''&
''''''%
θi P Θ

ei,µ8pθiq  P8µ8pθiq ¡ η,
ei,µpE,σ8qpθiq  PµpE,σ8qpθiqpµpE,σ8qq ¡ η,
ei,s  PspµpE,σ8qq   η, for all s ranked above µpE,σ8qpθiq by σ8pθiq;
ui,µ8pθiq  ui,µpE,σ8qpθiq ¡ ξ.
,//////.
//////-
,
Θpη,ξq must have a positive measure for some η, ξ ¡ 0 and is a subset of students who can
form a blocking pair in µpE,σ8q. Clearly, σ
8pθiq ranks µpE,σ8qpθiq but not µ8pθiq for all
θi P Θpη,ξq. We further define:
Θ
pIq
pη,ξq  Θpη,ξq X tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq ranks µpE,σ8qpθiq but not µ8pθiqu.
By Assumption 1, σpIq converges to σ8, and thus Θ
pIq
pη,ξq converges to Θpη,ξq and has a
positive measure when I is sufficiently large.
We show below that tσpIquIPN is not a sequence of equilibrium strategies. Consider a
unilateral deviation for θi P ΘpIqpη,ξq from σpIqpθiq to Li such that the only difference between
the two actions is that µpE,σ8qpθiq, ranked in σpIqpθiq, is replaced by µ8pθiq in Li while Li
is kept as a partial order of i’s true preferences.
By Lemma A1, for 0   φ   ξ{p1   ξq there exists n P N such that, in all F pIq with
I ¡ n, i is matched with µpE,σ8qpθiq with probability at least p1φq if submitting σpIqpθiq
but would have been matched with µ8pθiq if instead Li had been submitted.
Let EUpσpIqpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpIqpθiq. Then EUpσpIqpθiqq ¤
p1φqui,µpE,σ8qpθiq φ because maxstui,su ¤ 1 by assumption, and EUpLiq ¥ p1φqui,µ8pθiq.
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The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpIqpθiqq
¥p1 φqui,µ8pθiq  p1 φqui,µpE,σ8qpθiq  φ
¥p1 φqξ  φ
¡0,
which proves that tσpIquIPN is not a sequence of equilibrium strategies. This contradiction
further shows that Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σ8qpθiq  µ8pθiquq  0 and that σ8pθiq ranks µ8pθiq
for all θi P Θ except a measure-zero set of student types. 
We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part (i) is implied by Lemma A1 and Proposition A1. Because F pIq converges to
E almost surely and σpIq converges to σ8, P pIq converges to P pµpE,σ8qq almost surely.
Moreover, µpE,σ8q  µ8 except a measure-zero set of students implies that P pµpE,σ8qq 
P8. Therefore, limIÑ8 P
pIq  P8 almost surely.
To show part (ii), we first define ΘpIq  tθi P Θ | σpIqpθiq  σ8pθiqu. By Assumption 1,
GpIqpΘpIqq converges to zero almost surely. We have the following inequalities:
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,s
+
¤
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,s
+
GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
 GpIq
#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
¤GpIq   θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq( GpIq   θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq( ,
where the first inequality is due to the triangle inequality; the second inequality is because 
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P pIqq ui,s
(
and
 
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P8q ui,s
(
can
possibly differ only when Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq and because:#
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,s
+
  θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq( .
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Furthermore,
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq
(
GpIq  tθi P Θ | minpP8s , P pIqs q ¤ ei,s   maxpP8s , P pIqs q, Ds P Su .
The right hand side converges to zero almost surely, because almost surely GpIq converges
to G, which is atomless, and limnÑ8 P
pIq  P8 almost surely. Therefore,
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | Spei, P8q  Spei, P pIqq
(  0 almost surely. (A.2)
Moreover,
GpIq
  
θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
(
¤GpIqpΘpIqq  GpIq   θi P ΘzΘpIq | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq(
¤GpIqpΘpIqq  GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq ¡ ui,µ8pθiq & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P pIqµpIqpθiq
)	
 GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq   ui,µ8pθiq, ei,µ8pθiq   P pIqµ8pθiq, & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P
pIq
µpIqpθiq
)	
In the first inequality, we decompose the student type space into two, ΘpIq and ΘzΘpIq. In
the former, students do not adopt σ8, while those in the latter set do and thus rank the
school prescribed by µ8. The second inequality consider the events when µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
can possibly happen.
The almost-sure convergence of GpIq to G and that of P pIq to P8 implies that:
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq ¡ ui,µ8pθiq & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P pIqµpIqpθiq
)	
 0 almost surely,
because for any s such that ui,s ¡ ui,µ8pθiq, we must have ei,s   P8s .
Similarly, almost surely,
lim
IÑ8
GpIq
!
θi P ΘzΘpIq | ui,µpIqpθiq   ui,µ8pθiq, ei,µ8pθiq   P pIqµ8pθiq, & ei,µpIqpθiq ¥ P
pIq
µpIqpθiq
)	
 0.
Therefore, GpIq
  
θi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiq
(  0 almost surely. Together with (A.2),
it implies that GpIq
  
θi P Θ : µpIqpθiq R arg maxsPSpei,P pIqq ui,s
(
converges to zero almost
surely. In other words, tµpIquIPN is asymptotically stable. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
The first statement in part (i) is implied by Proposition 2. Suppose that i is in a
blocking pair with some school s. It means that the ex post cutoff of s is lower than i’s
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priority index at s. Therefore, if s P LpIqi , the stability of DA (with respect to ROLs)
implies that i must be accepted by s or by schools ranked above and thus preferred to
s. Therefore, i and s cannot form a blocking pair if s P LpIqi , which proves the second
statement in part (i).
Part (iii) is implied by Proposition 4 (part (i)).
To show part (ii), we let SpIq0  SzLpIqi and therefore:
B
pIq
i PrpDs P S0, ui,s ¡ ui,µpIqpθiq and ei,s ¥ P pIqs q
¤
¸
sPSpIq0
Pr

ei,t   P pIqt , @t P LpIqi , s.t., ui,t ¡ ui,s; ei,s ¥ P pIqs
	
.
Let B
pIq
i,s be Pr

ei,t   P pIqt , @t P LpIqi , s.t., ui,t ¡ ui,s; ei,s ¥ P pIqs
	
for s P SpIq0 . Since s P S0
and L
pIq
i is ex ante optimal for i in F
pIq, σpIq, it implies:
¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as

L
pIq
i , ei;σ
pIqpθiq, ei
	
dGpθiq  C
LpIqi 	
¥
¸
sPS
ui,s
»
as
 
L, ei;σ
pIqpθiq, ei

dGpθiq  C
LpIqi   1	
where L ranks all schools in L
pIq
i and s while respecting their true preference rankings,
i.e., adding s to the true partial preference order L
pIq
i while keeping the new list a true
partial preference order.
For notational convenience, we relabel the schools such that school k is the kth choice
in L and that s is kth school in L. Those not ranked in L are labeled as |LpIqi | 2,    , S.
It then follows that:
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
¥
k1¸
t1
0 BpIqi,s ui,s
 
|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
ui,t 

 Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , t 1
	

Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	

,

k1¸
t1
0 BpIqi,s ui,s

|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
ui,t  Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,s ¥ P pIqs ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	
,
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where the zeros in the first term on the right come from the upper invariance of DA. That
is, the admission probability at any school ranked above s is the same when i submits
either L
pIq
i or L.
Also note that ui,s ¡ ui,t for all t ¥ k   1 and that:
|L
pIq
i | 1¸
tk 1
Pr

ei,t ¥ P pIqt ; ei,s ¥ P pIqs ; ei,τ   P pIqτ , τ  1, . . . , k  1, k   1,    , t 1
	
¤ BpIqi,s .
Besides, ui,k 1 ¥ ui,t for all t  k   2,    , |Li|   1. Therefore, for all s P SpIq0 ,
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	 ¥ BpIqi,s ui,s BpIqi,s ui,k 1
This leads to:
B
pIq
i,s ¤
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
ui,s  ui,k 1 ¤
C
LpIqi   1	 C LpIqi 	
ui,s
.
Finally, B
pIq
i ¤
°
sPSpIq0
B
pIq
i,s ¤ |SzLi|Cp|Li| 1qCp|Li|qmax
sPSzLpIq
i
ui,s
. 
A.2.3 Asymptotic Distribution of Cutoffs and Convergence Rates
For the next result, we define the demand for each school in pE, σq as a function of the
cutoffs:
DspP | E, σq 
»
1pui,s  max
s1PSpei,P q

σpθiq
ui,s1qdGpθiq,
where σpθiq also denotes the set of schools ranked by i; 1pq is an indicator function. Let
DpP | E, σq  rDspP | E, σqssPS .
Assumption 2.
(i) There exists n P N such that σpIq  σ8 for all I ¡ n;
(ii) Dp | E, σ8q is C1 and BDpP8 | E, σ8q is invertible;
(iii)
°S
s1 qs   1.
Part (i) says that σ8 maintains as an equilibrium strategy in any economy of a size
that is above a threshold. This is supported partially by the discussion in Section A.2.4.
In particular, when Cp2q ¡ 0, part (i) is satisfied. Dp | E, σ8q being C1 (in part ii) holds
when G admits a continuous density. In this case, the fraction of students whose demand
is affected by changes in P is continuous. Part (iii) guarantees that every school has a
positive cutoff in the stable matching of E.
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Because of Assumption 2, our setting with cardinal preferences can be transformed
into one defined by students’ ROLs that is identical to that in Azevedo and Leshno (2016).
Therefore, some of their results are also satisfied in our setting.
Proposition A2. In a sequence of matchings, tµpIquIPN, of the sequence of random
economies and equilibrium strategies, tF pIq, σpIquIPN, satisfying Assumption 2, we have
the following results:
(i) The distribution of cutoffs in pF pIq, σpIqq satisfies:
?
I
 
P pIq  P8 dÝÑ Np0, V pσ8qq
where V pσ8q  BDpP8 | E, σ8q1Σ pBDpP8 | E, σ8q1q1, and
Σ 


q1p1 q1q q1q2    q1qS
q2q1 q2p1 q2q    ...
...
...
. . . qS1qS
qSq1    qSqS1 qSp1 qSq


.
(ii) For any η ¡ 0 and I ¡ n, there exist constants γ1 and γ2 such that the probability
that the matching µpIq has cutoffs ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η is bounded by γ1eγ2I :
Pr
 ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η   γ1eγ2I .
(iii) Moreover, suppose that G admits a continuous density. For any η ¡ 0 and I ¡ n,
there exist constants γ11 and γ
1
2 such that, in matching µ
pIq, the probability of the fraction
of students who can form a blocking pair being greater than η is bounded by γ11e
γ12I :
Pr

GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq ¡ η

  γ11eγ
1
2I .
Parts (i) and (ii) are from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) (Proposition G1 and part 2 of
Proposition 3), although our part (iii) is new and extends their part 3 of Proposition 3.
Proposition A2 describes convergence rates and thus has implications for empirical ap-
proaches based on stability (see Section 2.3).
Proof of Proposition A2 (part iii).
To show part (iii), we use similar techniques as in the proof for Proposition 3 (part 3)
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in Azevedo and Leshno (2016). We first derive the following results.
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s R rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, @s P S;µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P8q
ui,su
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P S;µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
¤GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiqu
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq
In the first equality, whenever ei,s R rminpP8s , P pImqs q,maxpP8s , P pImqs qs, @s P S, i faces the
same set of feasible schools given either P pIq or P8, Spei, P pIqq  Spei, P8q. Because µ8
is stable, µ8pθiq is i’s favorite school in Spei, P8q; together with the relaxation of the
conditions in the second term, it leads to the inequality.
By Azevedo and Leshno (2016) Proposition 3 (part 3), we can find γ11 and γ
1
2 such
that:
Pr
 
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ η{2
  γ11eγ12I{2. (A.3)
Let g be the supremum of the marginal probability density of ei,s across all s. Denote
the set of student types with priority indices which have at least one coordinate close to
P8 by distance η1{p2Sgq (where η1  η{4):
Θη1  tθi P Θ | Ds P S, |ei,s  P8s | ¤ η1{p2Sgqu.
Then GpΘη1q ¤ 2Sg  η1{p2Sgq  η1. The fraction of students in F pIq that have types in
Θη1 is then G
pIqpΘη1q. Note that GpIqpΘη1q is a random variable with mean GpΘη1q. By
the Vapnik-Chervonenkis Theorem,A.2
PrpGpIqpΘη1q ¡ 2η1q   Prp|GpIqpΘη1q GpΘη1q| ¡ η1q   γ11eγ
1
2I{4. (A.4)
Moreover, by part (ii), we know that:
Pr
 ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq   γ11eγ12I{4. (A.5)
A.2See Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and the references therein for more details on the theorem for its
application in our context.
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We can choose γ11 and γ
1
2 appropriately, so that (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5) are all satisfied.
When the event, ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq, does not happen,
tθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Su  Θη1 .
When neither ||P pIq  P8|| ¡ η1{p2Sgq nor GpIqpΘη1q ¡ 2η1 happens,
GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq ¤ 2η1  η{2;
the probability that neither of these two events happens is at least 1  γ11eγ12I{4 
γ11e
γ12I{4  1 γ11eγ12I{2. This implies,
PrpGpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq ¡ η{2q   γ11eγ
1
2I{2.
(A.6)
The events in (A.3) and (A.6) do not happen with probability at least 1γ11eγ12I{2
γ11e
γ12I{2  1 γ11eγ12I ; and when they do not happen,
GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq
¤GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq  µ8pθiqu
 GpIqptθi P Θ | ei,s P rminpP8s , P pIqs q,maxpP8s , P pIqs qq, Ds P Suq
¤η.
Therefore,
Pr

GpIqptθi P Θ | µpIqpθiq R arg max
sPSpei,P pIqq
ui,suq ¡ η

  γ11eγ
1
2I .

A.2.4 Properties of Equilibrium Strategies in Large Economies
We now discuss the properties of Bayesian Nash equilibria in a sequence of random
economies and thus provide some justifications to Assumptions 1 and 2.
We start with Lemma A2 showing that a strategy, which does not result in the stable
matching in the continuum economy when being adopted by students in the continuum
economy, cannot survive as an equilibrium strategy in sufficiently large economies. This
immediately implies that, in finite large economies, every student always includes in her
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ROL the matched school in the continuum-economy stable matching (Lemma A3). More-
over, students do not pay a cost to rank more schools in large economies (Lemma A4).
Lastly, when it is costly to rank more than one school (Cp2q ¡ 0), in sufficiently large
economies, it is an equilibrium strategy for every students to only rank the matched
school prescribed by the continuum-economy stable matching.
Lemma A2. If a strategy σ results in a matching µpE,σq in the continuum economy such
that Gptθi P Θ | µpE,σqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ 0, then there must exist n P N such that σ is not
an equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A2.
Suppose instead that there is a subsequence of finite random economies tF pInqunPN
such that σ is always an equilibrium. Note that we still have F pInq Ñ E almost surely,
and therefore tF pInq, σu converges to tE, σu almost surely.
Given the student-proposing DA, we focus on the student-optimal stable matching
(SOSM) in pF pIq, σq. By Proposition 3 of Azevedo and Leshno (2016), it must be that
P pInqÑP σ almost surely, where P pInq  P pµpF pInq,σqq and P σ  P pµpE,σqq.
Because there is a unique Nash equilibrium outcome in E, which is also the unique
stable matching in E by assumption, Gptθi P Θi | µpE,σqpθiq  µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 in the
continuum economy implies that P σ is not the cutoffs of µ8 (the stable matching in E),
P σ  P8.
Because there is a unique stable matching in E by assumption, µpE,σ8q is not stable
and thus is not an equilibrium outcome in E. There exist some η, ξ ¡ 0, such that:
Θpη,ξq 
$''''''&
''''''%
θi P Θ

ei,µ8pθiq  P8µ8pθiq ¡ η,
ei,µpE,σqpθiq  P σµpE,σqpθiq ¡ η,
ei,s  P σs   η, for all s ranked above µpE,σqpθiq by σpθiq;
ui,µ8pθiq  ui,µpE,σqpθiq ¡ ξ.
,//////.
//////-
Θpη,ξq must have a positive measure for some η, ξ ¡ 0 and is a subset of students who
can form a blocking pair in µpE,σq. Clearly, σpθiq ranks µpE,σqpθiq but not µ8pθiq for all
θi P Θpη,ξq.
We show below that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in sufficiently large economies.
Consider a unilateral deviation for θi P Θpη,ξq from σpθiq to Li such that the only difference
between the two actions is that µpE,σqpθiq, ranked in σpθiq, is replaced by µ8pθiq in Li
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while Li is kept as a partial order of i’s true preferences.
Because P pInqÑP σ almost surely, for 0   φ   ξ{p1  ξq there exists n1 P N such that,
in all F pInq with In ¡ n1, i is matched with µpE,σqpθiq with probability at least p1  φq
if submitting σpθiq but would have been matched with µ8pθiq if instead Li had been
submitted.
Let EUpσpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpθiq. Then EUpσpθiqq ¤
p1φqui,µpE,σqpθiq φ, because maxstui,su ¤ 1 by assumption, and EUpLiq ¥ p1φqui,µ8pθiq.
The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpθiqq
¥p1 φqui,µ8pθiq  p1 φqui,µpE,σqpθiq  φ
¥p1 φqξ  φ
¡0,
which proves that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in F pInq for In ¡ n1. This contradiction
further implies that there exist n P N such that σ is not an equilibrium strategy in all
F pIq with I ¡ n. 
Lemma A3. If a strategy σ is such that Gptθi P Θ | σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiquq ¡ 0,
then there must exist n P N such that σ is not an equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A3.
Note thatGptθi P Θ | σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiquq ¡ 0 impliesGptθi P Θ | µpE,σqpθiq 
µ8pθiquq ¡ 0, because i cannot be matched with µ8pθiq if σpθiq does not rank µ8pθiq.
Lemma A2 therefore implies the statement in this lemma. 
Lemmata A2 and A3 justify that, in large enough finite economies, we only consider
equilibrium strategies with which every student ranks her matched school in µ8 of the
continuum economy. We can further bound the number of choices that a student ranks
by the following lemma.
Lemma A4. Suppose CpKq  0 and CpK   1q ¡ 0 for 1 ¤ K ¤ pS  1q. Consider a
strategy σ such that σpθiq ranks at least K   1 schools for all θi P Θ1  Θ and GpΘ1q ¡ 0.
In the sequence of random economies, tF pIquIPN, there exists n P N such that σ is not an
equilibrium strategy in any economy F pIq for I ¡ n.
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Proof of Lemma A4.
By Lemma A3, we only need to consider all σ that rank µ8pθiq for θi. Otherwise, the
statement is satisfied already.
Let CpK   1q  ξ. By Proposition 3 of Azevedo and Leshno (2016), it must be
that P pIqÑP σ almost surely in the sequence tF pIq, σuIPN, where P pIq  P pµpF pIq,σqq and
P σ  P pµpE,σqq. For 0   φ   2ξ, there must exit n P N such that i is matched with
µ8pθiq with probability at least 1 φ in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Let EUpσpθiqq be the expected utility when submitting σpθiq. We compare this strat-
egy with any unilateral deviation Li that keeps ranking µ
8pθiq but drops one of the other
ranked schools in σpθiq.
Then EUpσpθiqq ¤ p1φqui,µ8pθiq φ ξ, where the right side assumes that i obtains
the highest possible utility (equal to one) whenever not being matched with µ8pθiq.
Moreover, EUpLiq ¥ p1 φqui,µ8pθiq   ξ. The difference between the two actions is:
EUpLiq  EUpσpθiqq ¥ 2ξ  φ ¡ 0,
which proves that σ is an equilibrium strategy in F pIq for I ¡ n. 
Moreover, when Cp2q ¡ 0, we can obtain even sharper results:
Lemma A5. Suppose Cp2q ¡ 0 (i.e., it is costly to rank more than one school), and
σpθiq  pµ8pθiqq (i.e., only ranking the school prescribed by µ8) for all student types. In
a sequence of random economies tF pIquIPN, there exists n P N such that σ is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in F pIq for all I ¡ n.
Proof of Lemma A5. This lemma is implied by Lemma A3 and Lemma A4 (when
K  1). 
A.2.5 Nash equilibrium and Stable Outcome
Example A1 (An unstable Nash equilibrium outcome in the continuum econ-
omy). Suppose that the continuum of students consists of three types, Θ  tΘ1,Θ2,Θ3u,
with each type being of the same measure, 1{3. Let S  ts1, s2, s3u be the set of schools and
q  p1{3, 1{3, 1{3q the vector of capacities. Student preferences and the priority structure
(i.e., student priority indices at each school) are given in the table below. Student prior-
ity indices are random draws from a uniform distribution on the interval therein, which
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allows schools to strictly rank students. It is assumed that students are only allowed to
rank up to two schools.
Student preferences Student priority indices
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
School s1 1 0.5 0 p1{3, 2{3s r0, 1{3s p2{3, 1s
School s2 0 0 0.5 p1{3, 2{3s r0, 1{3s p2{3, 1s
School s3 0.5 1 1 p2{3, 1s p1{3, 2{3s r0, 1{3s
ROL by type
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
1st choice s1 s1 s3
2nd choice s3 s2 s1
Students submit ROLs as shown in the above. One can verify that the outcome is
that Type-1 students are matched with s1, Type-2 with s2, and Type-3 with s3, which
is indicated by the boxes in the table. This matching is not stable as Type-2 students
have justified envy for s3, i.e., a positive measure of Type-2 students can form a blocking
pair with School s3. However, there is no profitable deviation for any subset of Type-2
students.
The above example is based on the discrete version in Haeringer and Klijn (2009).
They further show that, in discrete and finite economies, DA with constraints implements
stable matchings in Nash equilibria if and only if the student priority indices at all schools
satisfy the so-called Ergin acyclicity condition (Ergin, 2002). We extend this result to
the continuum economy and to a more general class of DA mechanisms where the cost
function of ranking more than one school, Cp|L|q, is flexible.
Definition A1. In a continuum economy, we fix a vector of capacities, tqsuSs1, and
a distribution of priority indices, H. An Ergin cycle is constituted of distinct schools
ps1, s2q and subsets of students tΘ1,Θ2,Θ3u (of equal measure q0 ¡ 0 ), whose elements
are denoted by θ1, θ2, and θ3, respectively, and whose “identities” are i1, i2, and i3, such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Cycle condition: ei1,s1 ¡ ei2,s1 ¡ ei3,s1, and ei3,s2 ¡ ei1,s2, for all i1, i2, and i3.
(ii) Scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty) disjoint sets of agents Θs1, Θs2 P
Θz tΘ1,Θ2,Θ3u such that ei,s1 ¡ ei2,s1 for all θi P Θs1, |Θs1 |  qs1  q0; ei,s2 ¡ ei1,s2 for
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all i P Θs1, and |Θs2 |  qs2  q0.
A priority index distribution H is Ergin-acyclic if it allows no Ergin cycles.
Note that this acyclicity condition is satisfied if all schools rank students in the same
way. Under this acyclicity condition, we can extend Theorem 6.3 in Haeringer and Klijn
(2009) to the continuum economy.
Proposition A3. In the continuum economy E:
(i) Every stable outcome is an outcome of some Nash equilibrium.
(ii) If Cp2q  0, every (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium outcome is stable if and only if
the economy satisfies Ergin-acyclicity (Haeringer-Klijn, 2009).
(iii) If Cp2q ¡ 0, all (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable.
(iv) If Cp|L|q  0 for all L, the unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE) is
when everyone ranks all schools truthfully, and the corresponding outcome is the
student-optimal stable matching.
Proof. Part (i) can be shown by letting every student i submit a one-school list including
only µ8pθiq.
To prove parts (ii) and (iii), we can use the proof of Theorem 6.3 in Haeringer and
Klijn (2009) and, therefore, that of Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002). They can be directly
extended to the continuum economy under more general DA mechanisms, although they
focus on discrete economies. We notice the following:
(a) The continuum economy can be “discretized” in a similar manner as in Example A1
and each subset of students can be treated as a single student. When doing so, we
do not impose restrictions on the sizes of the subsets, as long as they have a positive
measure. This allows us to use the derivations in the aforementioned proofs.
(b) The flexibility in the cost function of ranking more schools does not impose addi-
tional restrictions. As we focus on Nash equilibrium, for any strategy with more
than one school listed, we can find a one-school list that has the same or higher
payoff. And indeed, many steps in the aforementioned proofs involve such a treat-
ment.
To show part (iv), we notice that a perturbed game is a copy of a base school choice
game, with the restriction that only totally mixed strategies are allowed to be played.
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It is known that the set of trembling hand perfect equilibria is the set of undominated
strategies, which implies that strict truth-telling is the unique THPE. 
A.3 Estimation under the Strict Truth-Telling Assumption with
Outside Option
The following discussion supplements Section 2.2 in which we present how weak truth-
telling (WTT) can be applied to data on school choice and college admissions and what
assumptions it entails. However, assuming the length of submitted ROL is exogenous
(Assumption WTT2) may seem restrictive. An alternative way to relax this assumption
is to introduce an outside option and to make some school unacceptable to some students.
Suppose that i’s utility for her outside option is denoted by ui,0  Vi,0   i,0, where
i,0 is a type I extreme value. We then augment the type space of each student with the
outside option and let σS : RpS 1q  r0, 1sS Ñ L be an STT pure strategy defined on the
augmented preference space. More precisely, one version of the STT assumption contains
the following two assumptions:
Assumption (Strict Truth-Telling with Outside Option).
STT1. σSpui, ui,0, eiq ranks all i’s acceptable schools according to her true preferences.
STT2. Students do not rank unacceptable schools: ui,0 ¡ ui,s1 for all s1 not ranked by
σSpui, ui,0, eiq.
Given these two assumptions, similar to the case with WTT, either MLE or GMM
can be applied based on the following choice probabilities:
Pr
 
σSpui, ui,0, eiq  L
 Zi; β
Pr  ui,l1 ¡    ¡ ui,lK ¡ ui,0 ¡ ui,s1 @ s1 P SzL  Zi; β
 exppVi,0q
exppVi,0q  
°
s1RL exppVi,s1q
¹
sPL

exppVi,sq
exppVi,0q  
°
s1PS exppVi,s1q


.
For an example where the STT assumption is imposed, see He and Magnac (2016) in
which the authors observe students ranking all available options and have information on
the acceptability of each option.
Assumptions STT1 and STT2 can be justified as an equilibrium outcome when there
is no application cost. However, there may be an issue of multiple equilibria created by
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unacceptable schools. Namely, if a student can always decline to enroll at an unacceptable
school, she may not mind including or excluding that school in her ROL and being
assigned to it (He, 2015). This is labeled as the issue of multiple best responses in
He (2015), because a student is always indifferent between bottom-ranking or omitting
unacceptable schools in her ROLs in any equilibrium.
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Appendix B Data
B.1 Data Sources
For the empirical analysis, we use three administrative data sets on Parisian students,
which are linked using an encrypted version of the French national student identifer
(Identifiant National E´le`ve).
(i) Application Data: The first data set was provided to us by the Paris Education
Authority (Rectorat de Paris) and contains all the information necessary to replicate
the assignment of students to public academic-track high schools in the city of Paris
for the 2013-2014 academic year. This includes the schools’ capacities, the students’
ROLs of schools, and their priority indices at every school. Moreover, it contains
information on students’ socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, parents’
SES, low-income status, etc.), and their home addresses, allowing us to compute
distances to each school in the district.
(ii) Enrollment Data: The second data set is a comprehensive register of students
enrolled in Paris’ middle and high schools during the 2012–2013 and 2013–2014
academic years (Base Ele`ves Acade´mique), which is also from the Paris Education
Authority. This data set allows to track students’ enrollment status in all Parisian
public and private middle and high schools.
(iii) Exam Data: The third data set contains all Parisian middle school students’
individual examination results for a national diploma, the Diploˆme national du
brevet (DNB), which students take at the end of middle school. We obtained this
data set from the statistical office of the French Ministry of Education (Direction
de l’E´valuation, de la Prospective et de la Performance du Ministe`re de l’E´ducation
Nationale).
B.2 Definition of Variables
Priority Indices. Students’ priority indices at every school are recorded as the sum of
three main components: (i) students receive a “district” bonus of 600 points on each of
the schools in their list which are located in their home district; (ii) students’ academic
performance during the last year of middle school is graded on a scale of 400 to 600
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points; (iii) students from low-income families are awarded an additional bonus of 300
points. We convert these priority indices into percentiles between 0 and 1.
Student Scores. Based on the DNB exam data set, we compute several measures
of student academic performance, which are normalized as percentiles between 0 and 1
among all Parisian students who took the exam in the same year. Both French and math
scores are used, and we also construct the students’ composite score, which is the average
of the French and math scores. Note that students’ DNB scores are different from the
academic performance measure used to calculate student priority indices as an input into
the DA mechanism. Recall that the latter is based on the grades obtained by students
throughout their final year of middle school.
Socio-Economic Status. Students’ socio-economic status is based on their parents’
occupation. We use the French Ministry of Education’s official classification of occu-
pations to define “high SES”: if the occupation of the student’s legal guardian (usually
one of the parents) belongs to the “very high SES” category (company managers, exec-
utives, liberal professions, engineers, academic and art professions), the student is coded
as high SES, otherwise she is coded as low SES.A.3
B.3 Construction of the Main Data Set for Analyses
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the Southern District of Paris (District Sud).
We focus on public middle school students who are allowed to continue their studies in
the academic track of upper secondary education and whose official residence is in the
Southern District. We exclude those with disabilities, those who are repeating the first
year of high school, and those who were admitted to specific selective tracks offered by
certain public high schools in Paris (e.g., music majors, bilingual courses, etc.), as these
students are given absolute priority in the assignment over other students. This leads to
the exclusion of 350 students, or 18 percent of the total, the majority of whom are grade
repeaters. Our data thus include 1,590 students from 57 different public middle schools,
with 96 percent of students coming from one of the district’s 24 middle schools.
A.3There are four official categories: low SES, medium SES, high SES, and very high SES.
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Appendix C Monte Carlo Simulations
This appendix provides details on the Monte Carlo simulations that we perform to assess
our empirical approaches and model selection tests. Section C.1 specifies the model,
Section C.2 describes the data generating processes, Section C.3 reports a number of
summary statistics for the simulated data, Section C.4 presents the estimation and testing
procedures, and, finally, Section C.5 discusses the main results.
C.1 Model Specification
Economy Size. We consider an economy where I  500 students compete for admis-
sion to S  6 schools. The vector of school capacities is specified as follows:
I  tqsu6s1  t50, 50, 25, 50, 150, 150u.
Setting the total capacity of schools (475 seats) to be strictly smaller than the number of
students (500) simplifies the analysis by ensuring that each school has a strictly positive
cutoff in equilibrium.
Spatial Configuration. The school district is stylized as a disc of radius 1 (Figure C1).
The schools (represented by red circles) are evenly located on a circle of radius 1{2 around
the district centroid; the students (represented by blue circles) are uniformly distributed
across the district area. The cartesian distance between student i and school s is denoted
by di,s.
Student Preferences. To represent student preferences over schools, we adopt a par-
simonious version of the random utility model described in Section 2.1. Student i’s utility
from attending school s is specified as follows:
ui,s  10  αs  di,s   γpai  a¯sq   i,s, s  1, . . . , 6; (A.7)
where 10   αs is school s’s fixed effects; di,s is the walking distance from student i’s
residence to school s; ai is student i’s ability; a¯s is school s’s quality; and i,s is an error
term that is drawn from a type-I extreme value distribution. Setting the effect of distance
to 1 ensures that other coefficients can be interpreted in terms of willingness to travel.
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Figure C1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Spatial Distribution of Students and Schools
Notes: This figure shows the spatial configuration of the school district considered in one of the Monte Carlo samples, for
the case with 500 students and 6 schools. The school district is represented as a disc of radius 1. The small blue and large
red circles show the location of students and of schools, respectively.
The school fixed effects above the common factor, 10, are specified as follows:
tαsu6s1  t0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5u
Adding the common value of 10 for every school ensures that all schools are acceptable
in the simulated samples.
Students’ abilities taiuIi1 are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on the in-
terval r0, 1s. School qualities ta¯suSs1 are exogenous to students’ idiosyncratic preferences
i,s. The procedure followed to ascribe values to the schools’ qualities is discussed at the
end of this section.
The positive coefficient γ on the interaction term ai  a¯s reflects the assumption that
high-ability students value school quality more than low-ability students. In the simula-
tions, we set γ  3.
Priority Indices. Students are ranked separately by each school based on a school-
specific index ei,s. The vector of student priority indices at a given school s, tei,suIi1
is constructed as correlated random draws with marginal uniform distributions on the
interval [0,1], such that: (i) student i’s index at each school is correlated with her ability
ai with a correlation coefficient of ρ; (ii) i’s indices at any two schools s1 and s2 are
also correlated with correlation coefficient ρ. When ρ is set equal to 1, a student has
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the same priority at all schools. When ρ is set equal to zero, her priority indices at the
different schools are uncorrelated. For the simulations presented in this appendix, we
choose ρ  0.7. It is assumed that student know their priority indices but not their
priority ranking at each school.
School Quality. To ensure that school qualities ta¯suSs1 are exogenous to students’
idiosyncratic preferences, while being close to those observed in Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of the school choice game, we adopt the following procedure: we consider the un-
constrained student-proposing DA where students rank all schools truthfully; students’
preferences are constructed using random draws of errors and a common prior about the
average quality of each school; students rank schools truthfully and are assigned through
the DA mechanism; each school’s quality is computed as the average ability of students
assigned to that school; a fixed-point vector of school qualities, denoted by ta¯suSs1, is
found; the value of each school’s quality is set equal to mean value of a¯s across the
samples.
The resulting vector of school qualities is:
ta¯su6s1  t0.28, 0.39, 0.68, 0.65, 0.47, 0.61u
C.2 Data Generating Processes
The simulated data are constructed under two distinct data generating processes (DGPs).
DGP 1: Constrained/Truncated DA. This DGP considers a situation where the
student-proposing DA is used to assign students to schools but where the number of
schools that students are allowed to rank, K, is strictly smaller than the total number of
available schools, S. For expositional simplicity, students are assumed to incur no cost
when ranking exactly K schools. Hence:
C p|L|q 
$&
% 0 if |L| ¤ K 8 if |L| ¡ K
In the simulations, we set K  4 (students are allowed to rank up to 4 schools out of 6).
A.26
DGP 2: Unconstrained DA with Cost. This DGP considers the case where stu-
dents are not formally constrained in the number of schools they can rank but nevertheless
incur a constant marginal cost, denoted by cp¡ 0q, each time they increase the length of
their ROL by one, if this list contains more than one school. Hence:
C p|L|q  c  p|L|  1q ,
where the marginal cost c is strictly positive. In the simulations, we set c  106.
For each DGP, we adopt a two-stage procedure to solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the school choice game.
Stage 1: Distribution of Cutoffs Under Unconstrained DA. Students’ “initial”
beliefs about the distribution of school cutoffs are based on the distribution of cutoffs that
arises when students submit unrestricted truthful rankings of schools under the standard
DA. Specifically:
(i) For m  1,    ,M , we independently generate sample m by drawing students’
geographic coordinates, ability a
pmq
i , school-specific priority indices e
pmq
i,s , and id-
iosyncratic preferences 
pmq
i,s over the S schools for all I students. We then calculate
u
pmq
i,s for all i  1,    , I, s  1,    , S, and m  1,    ,M .
(ii) Student i in sample m submits a complete and truthful ranking rpupmqi q of the
schools; i.e., i is strictly truth-telling.
(iii) After collecting trpupmqi quIi1, the DA mechanism assigns students to schools taking
into account their priority indices in sample m.
(iv) Each matching µpmq in samplem determines a vector of school cutoffs P pmq  tP pmqs uSs1.
(v) The cutoffs tP pmquMm1 are used to derive the empirical distribution of school cutoffs
under the unconstrained DA, which is denoted by Fˆ 0p | tP pmquMm1q.
In the simulations, we set M  500.
Stage 2: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For each DGP, the M Monte Carlo samples
generated in Stage 1 are used to solve the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the school choice
game. Specifically:
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(i) Each student i in each sample m determines all possible true partial preference
orders tLpmqi,n uNn1 over the schools, i.e., all potential ROLs of length between 1 and
K that respect i’s true preference ordering Ri,m of schools among those ranked in
L
pmq
i,n ; for each student, there are N 
°K
k1 S!{rk!pS  kq!s such partial orders.
Under the constrained/truncated DA (DGP 1), students consider only true partial
preference orderings of length K (  S), i.e., 15 candidate ROLs when they rank
exactly 4 schools out of 6;A.4 under the unconstrained DA with cost (DGP 2),
students consider all true partial orders of length up to S, i.e., 63 candidate ROLs
when they can rank up to 6 schools.
(ii) For each candidate ROL L
pmq
i,n , student i estimates the (unconditional) probabilities
of being admitted to each school by comparing her indices ei,s to the distribution of
cutoffs. Initial beliefs on the cutoff distribution are based on Fˆ 0p | tP pmquMm1q, i.e.,
the empirical distribution of cutoffs under unconstrained DA with strictly truth-
telling students.
(iii) Each student selects the ROL L
pmq
i that maximizes her expected utility, where the
utilities of each school are weighted by the probabilities of admission according to
her beliefs.
(iv) After collecting tLpmqi uIi1, the DA mechanism is run in sample m.
(v) The matching outcomes across the M samples jointly determine the “posterior”
empirical distribution of school cutoffs, Fˆ 1p | q.
(vi) Students use Fˆ 1p | q as their beliefs, and steps (ii) to (v) are repeated until a fixed
point is found, which occurs when the posterior distribution of cutoffs (Fˆ tp | q) is
consistent with students’ beliefs Fˆ t1p | q. The equilibrium beliefs are denoted by
Fˆ p | q.
The simulated school choice data are then constructed based on a new set of M Monte
Carlo samples, which are distinct from the samples used to find the equilibrium distribu-
tion of cutoffs. In each of these new Monte Carlo samples, submitted ROLs are students’
best response to the equilibrium distribution of cutoffs (Fˆ p | q). The school choice data
consist of students’ priority indices, their submitted ROLs, the student-school matching
outcome, and the realized cutoffs in each sample.
A.4This is without loss of generality, because in equilibrium the admission probability is non-degenerate
and it is, therefore, in students’ best interest to rank exactly 4 schools.
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C.3 Summary Statistics of Simulated Data
We now present some descriptive analysis on the equilibrium cutoff distributions and the
500 Monte Carlo samples of school choice data that are simulated for each DGP.
Equilibrium Distribution of Cutoffs. The equilibrium distribution of school cutoffs
is displayed in Figure C2 separately for each DGP. In line with the theoretical predictions
(Proposition A2), the marginal distribution of cutoffs is approximately normal. Because
both DGPs involve the same profiles of preferences and produce almost identical match-
ings, the empirical distribution of cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA (left panel)
is very similar to that observed under the unconstrained DA with cost (right panel).
(a) Constrained/truncated DA
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(b) Unconstrained DA with cost
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Figure C2: Monte Carlo Simulations: Equilibrium Distribution of School Cutoffs
(6 schools, 500 students)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium marginal distribution of school cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA (left
panel) and the DA with cost (right panel) in a setting where 500 students compete for admission to 6 schools. With 500
simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command.
School cutoffs are not strictly aligned with the school fixed effects, since cutoffs are
also influenced by school size. In the simulations, small schools (e.g., Schools 3 and 4)
tend to have higher cutoffs than larger schools (e.g., Schools 5 and 6) because, in spite
of being less popular, they can be matched only with a small number of students, which
pushes their cutoffs upward.A.5
Figure C3 reports the marginal distribution of cutoffs in the constrained/truncated
DA for various economy sizes. The simulations show that as the number of seats and the
A.5Note that this phenomenon is also observed if one sets γ  0, i.e., when students’ preferences over
schools do not depend on the interaction term ai  a¯s.
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number of students increase proportionally while holding the number of schools constant,
the distribution of school cutoffs degenerates and becomes closer to a normal distribution.
(a) 100 students
School 1
School 2
School 5 School 6 School 4 School 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
D
en
si
ty
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
School cutoff
(b) 200 students
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Figure C3: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of Economy Size on the Equilibrium
Distribution of Cutoffs (Constrained/Truncated DA)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium marginal distribution of school cutoffs under the constrained/truncated DA
(ranking 4 out of 6 schools) when varying the number of students, I, who compete for admission into 6 schools with a total
enrollment capacity of I  0.95 seats. Using 500 simulated samples, the line fits are from a Gaussian kernel with optimal
bandwidth using MATLAB’s ksdensity command.
Summary Statistics. Table C1 shows some descriptive statistics of the simulated data
from both DGPs. The reported means are averaged over the 500 Monte Carlo samples.
All students under the constrained/truncated DA submit ROLs of the maximum
allowed length (4 schools). Under the unconstrained DA with cost, students are allowed
to rank as many schools as they wish but, due to the cost of submitting longer lists, they
rank 4.6 schools on average.
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Under both DGPs, all school seats are filled, and, therefore, 95 percent of students are
assigned to a school. Weak truth-telling is violated under the constrained/truncated DA,
since less than half of submitted ROLs rank truthfully students’ most-preferred schools.
Although less widespread, violations of WTT are still observed under the unconstrained
DA with cost, since about 20 percent of students do not truthfully rank their most-
preferred schools. By contrast, almost every student is matched with her favorite feasible
school under both DGPs.
Table C1: Monte Carlo Simulations: Summary Statistics
Data generating process
Constrained/truncated DA Unconstrained DA with cost
(1) (2)
Panel A. Outcomes
Average length of submitted ROL 4.00 4.60
(0.000) (0.054)
Assigned to a school 0.950 0.950
(0.000) (0.000)
Weakly truth-telling 0.391 0.792
(0.022) (0.018)
Assigned to favorite feasible school 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Panel B. Parameters
Number of students 500 500
Number of schools 6 6
Number of simulated samples 500 500
Maximum possible length of ROL 4 6
Marginal application cost (c) 0 106
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of simulated data under two DGPs: (i) constrained/truncated DA (column 1):
students are only allowed to rank 4 schools out of 6; and (ii) unconstrained DA with cost (column 2): students can rank as
many schools as they like, but incur a constant marginal cost of c  106 per extra school included in their ROL beyond
the first choice. Standard deviations across the 500 simulation samples are in parentheses.
Comparative Statics. To explore how the cost of ranking more schools affects weak
truth-telling and ex post stability in equilibrium, we simulated data for DGP 2 (DA with
cost) using different values of the cost parameter c, while keeping the other parameters
at their baseline values.A.6
For each value of the cost parameter, we simulated 500 samples of school choice data
and computed the following statistics by averaging across samples: (i) average length of
A.6We performed a similar exercise for DGP 1 (constrained/truncated DA) by varying the number of
schools that students are allowed to rank. The results (available upon request) yield conclusions similar
to those based on DGP 2 (DA with cost).
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submitted ROL; (ii) average fraction of weakly truth-telling students; and (iii) average
fraction of students assigned to their favorite feasible school.
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Figure C4: Monte Carlo Simulations: Impact of the Marginal Cost of Applying to
Schools on Equilibrium Outcomes (500 Students, 6 Schools)
Notes: This figure presents summary statistics of simulated data under unconstrained DA with cost (DGP 2), in which
students can rank as many schools as they like, but incur a constant marginal cost c per extra school included in their
ROL beyond the first. The data are simulated using different values of the marginal cost parameter c, while maintaining
the other parameters at their baseline values. For each value of the cost parameter, 500 samples of school choice data
are simulated. The following statistics are computed by averaging across samples: (i) average length of submitted ROL;
(ii) average fraction of weakly truth-telling students; (iii) average fraction of students matched with favorite feasible school.
The results of this comparative statics exercise are displayed in Figure C4. They
confirm that, in our simulations, stability is a weaker assumption than WTT whenever
students face a cost of ranking more schools: the share of students assigned to their
favorite feasible school (blue line) is always larger than the share of WTT students (red
line). Consistent with the predictions from Section 1.4.2, the fraction of students who are
matched with their favorite feasible school decreases with the marginal cost of ranking
more schools (parameter c). In our simulations, violations of this assumption are very
rare, except in the extreme case where students face a large marginal application cost c
equal to 1 (in which case students rank only 1.3 school on average).
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C.4 Estimation and Testing
Identifying Assumptions. With the simulated data at hand, student preferences de-
scribed by Equation (A.7) are estimated under different sets of identifying assumptions:
(i) Weak Truth-Telling. The choice probabilities for individual ROLs can be fully
specified and the corresponding rank-ordered logit model is estimated by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE), as discussed in Section 2.2.
(ii) Stability. Under the assumption that students are matched with their favorite
feasible school given the ex post cutoffs, the model is estimated by MLE based on a
conditional logit model where each student’s choice set is restricted to the ex post
feasible schools and where the matched school is the chosen alternative.A.7
(iii) Stability and Undominated Strategies. The method of moment (in)equalities in An-
drews and Shi (2013) is used to obtain point estimates, where conditional moment
inequalities are derived from students’ observed orderings of all 15 possible pairs of
schools (see Section 2.5). The variables that are used to interact with these condi-
tional moment inequalities and thus to obtain the unconditional ones are student
ability (ai), distance to School 1 (di,1) and distance to School 2 (di,2), which brings
the total number of moment inequalities to 120. The approach proposed by Bugni
et al. (2017) is used to construct the marginal confidence intervals for the point
estimates.
Model Selection Tests. Two tests are implemented:
(i) Truth-Telling vs. Stability. This test is carried out by constructing a Hausman-type
test statistic from the estimates of the WTT and stability approaches. Under the
null hypothesis that students are WTT, both estimators βˆTT and βˆST are consistent
but only βˆTT is asymptotically efficient. Under the alternative that the matching
outcome is stable but students are not WTT, only βˆST is consistent.
(ii) Stability vs. Undominated Strategies. As shown in Section 2.5, stability implies a set
of moment equalities, while undominated strategies lead to another set of moment
inequalities. When undominated strategies are assumed to be satisfied, testing
A.7The stability-based estimator can be equivalently obtained using a GMM estimation with moment
equalities defined by the first-order conditions of the log-likelihood function.
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stability amounts to checking if the identified set of the moment (in)equality model
is empty. Specifically, we apply the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015) (Test RS).
C.5 Results
The results from 500 Monte Carlo samples are reported in the main text (Table 2). They
are consistent with the theoretical predictions for both the constrained/truncated DA
(Panel A) and the unconstrained DA with cost (Panel B).
Weak Truth-Telling. The coefficients reported in column 2 of Table 2 show that
violation of the WTT assumption leads to severely biased estimates. In both DGPs,
students’ valuation of popular schools tends to be underestimated. This problem is
particularly acute when one considers the smaller schools (e.g., Schools 3 and 4), which
often have higher cutoffs than the larger ones (see Figure C2), and are therefore more
often left out of students’ ROLs due to low admission probabilities. The WTT-based
estimator is more biased under the constrained/truncated DA.
Stability. By contrast, estimation under the assumption that the matching outcome is
stable performs well in our simulations. The point estimates (column 5) are reasonably
close to the true parameter values, although they are more dispersed than the WTT
(column 6 vs. column 3). This efficiency loss is a direct consequence of restricting the
choice sets to include only feasible schools and of considering a single choice situation for
every matched student.
Test of Truth-Telling vs. Stability. Under the assumption that the matching out-
come is stable, the Hausman test strongly rejects truth-telling in the constrained/truncated
DA simulations (last row of Panel A in Table 2) and rejects this assumption in 37 percent
of the samples simulated under the unconstrained DA with cost (last row of Panel B),
under which truth-telling is violated for only 21 percent of students (Table C1).
Stability and Undominated Strategies. The results from the moment (in)equalities
approach show that in the two specific cases under study, the over-identifying information
provided by students’ true partial orders of schools has only a small impact on estimates
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(column 8 vs. column 5).A.8 On average, estimates based on the method of moment
(in)equalities are closer to the true values of the parameters (column 9 vs. column 6) but,
unfortunately, the marginal confidence intervals obtained using the Bugni et al. (2017)
approach tend to be conservative, especially relative to the stability-based estimates from
MLE. As a result, the coverage probability (CP) of 95 percent confidence interval is close
to one (column 10 vs. column 7).
Stability vs. Undominated Strategies. Stability is tested against undominated
strategies by applying the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015) to check whether the
identified set of the moment (in)equality model is empty. This tests fails to reject stabil-
ity in all samples (last row of Panel A and of Panel B).A.9
Efficiency Loss from Stability-Based Estimates. The efficiency loss from estimat-
ing the model under stability is further explored by comparing the truth-telling-based
and stability-based estimates in a setting where students are strictly truth-telling. To
that end, we generate a new set of 500 Monte Carlo samples using the unconstrained DA
DGP, after setting the marginal application cost c to zero. In this setting, all students
submit truthful ROLs that rank all 6 schools. The estimation results, which are reported
in Table C2, show that while both truth-telling-based and stability-based estimates are
close to the true parameters values, the latter are much more imprecisely estimated than
the former (column 6 vs. column 3): the stability-based estimates have standard devi-
ations 2.5 to 3.8 times larger than the TT-based estimates. Note, however, that the
efficiency loss induced by the stability assumption is considerably reduced when combing
stability and undominated strategies (column 9 vs. column 3): the standard deviations
of estimates based on the moment (in)equality approach are only 1.3 to 1.9 larger than
their truth-telling counterparts.
Reassuringly, the Hausman test rejects truth-telling against stability in exactly 5 per-
cent of samples, which is the intended type-I error rate. This test can therefore serve
as a useful tool to select the efficient truth-telling-based estimates over the less efficient
A.8Larger improvements are obtained when we relax the constraint on the number of choices than
students can submit or when we reduce the marginal cost of ranking an extra school (results available
upon request).
A.9To evaluate the power of the two tests, especially the test for stability, we constructed some simulation
examples in which stability is rejected when 30 percent of students are not assigned to their favorite
feasible school. These results are available upon request.
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stability-based estimates when both assumptions are satisfied.
Table C2: Monte Carlo Results: Unconstrained DA (500 Students, 6 Schools, 500
Samples)
Identifying assumptions
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability
Stability and
undominated
strategies
True value Mean SD CP Mean SD CP Mean SD CP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Parameters
School 2 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.94 0.51 0.29 0.94 0.50 0.12 1.00
School 3 1.00 1.01 0.16 0.95 1.05 0.58 0.96 1.00 0.22 1.00
School 4 1.50 1.52 0.15 0.95 1.54 0.52 0.96 1.51 0.21 1.00
School 5 2.00 2.02 0.11 0.96 2.02 0.30 0.96 2.02 0.14 1.00
School 6 2.50 2.52 0.14 0.94 2.54 0.45 0.96 2.53 0.19 1.00
Own ability  school quality 3.00 2.98 0.66 0.95 2.96 2.29 0.96 3.08 0.99 1.00
Distance 1.00 1.00 0.08 0.96 1.01 0.20 0.95 1.02 0.16 1.00
Model selection tests
Truth-telling (H0) vs. Stability (H1): H0 rejected in 5.0% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Stability (H0) vs. Undominated strategies (H1): H0 rejected in 0% of samples (at 0.05 significance level).
Notes: This table reports Monte Carlo results from estimating students’ preferences under different sets of identifying
assumptions: (i) weak truth-telling; (ii) stability; (iii) stability and undominated strategies. 500 Monte Carlo samples
of school choice data are simulated under the following data generating process for an economy in which 500 students
compete for admission to 6 schools: an unconstrained DA where students can rank as many schools as they wish, with no
cost for including an extra school in their ROL. Under assumption (iii), the model is estimated using Andrews and Shi
(2013)’s method of moment (in)equalities. Column 1 reports the true values of the parameters. The mean and standard
deviation (SD) of point estimates across the Monte Carlo samples are reported in columns 2, 5 and 8, and in columns 3,
6 and 9, respectively. Columns 4, 7 and 10 report the coverage probabilities (CP) for the 95 percent confidence intervals.
The confidence intervals in models (i) and (ii) are the Wald-type confidence intervals obtained from the inverse of the
Hessian matrix. The marginal confidence intervals in model (iii) are computed using the method proposed by Bugni et al.
(2017). Truth-telling is tested against stability by constructing a Hausman-type test statistic from the estimates of both
approaches. Stability is tested against undominated strategies by checking if the identified set of the moment(in)equality
model is empty, using the test proposed by Bugni et al. (2015).
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Appendix D Goodness of Fit
This appendix presents the goodness-of-fit statistics that we use to compare the estimates
of the model described by Equation (11) in the main text. These estimates are obtained
under different sets of identifying assumptions and are reported in Table 5. The goodness-
of-fit statistics described in Section D.1 are based on simulation techniques, whereas those
described in Section D.2 use closed-form expressions for the choice probabilities (due to
the logit specification).
D.1 Simulation-Based Goodness-of-Fit Measures
To compare different estimators’ ability to predict school cutoffs and students’ assignment,
we use several simulation-based goodness-of-fit statistics. We keep fixed the estimated
coefficients and Zi,s, and draw utility shocks as type-I extreme values. This leads to
the simulated utilities for every student in 300 simulation samples. When studying the
WTT-based estimates, we let students submit their top 8 schools according to their
simulated preferences; the matching outcome is obtained by running DA. For the other
sets of estimates, because stability is assumed, we focus on the unique stable matching
in each sample, which is calculated using students’ priority indices and simulated ordinal
preferences.
Predicted Cutoffs. Observed school cutoffs are compared to those simulated using
the different estimates. The results, which are averaged over the 300 simulated samples,
are reported in Table D3, with standard deviations across the samples in parentheses (see
Figure 4 in the main text for a graphical representation).
Predicted Assignment. Students’ observed assignment is compared to their simu-
lated assignment by computing the average predicted fraction of students who are as-
signed to their observed assignment school; in other words, this is the average fraction of
times each student is assigned to her observed assignment in the 300 simulated samples,
with standard deviations across the simulation samples reported in parentheses. The
results are reported in Panel A of Table 6 in the main text.
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D.2 Predicted vs. Observed Partial Preference Order
Our final set of goodness of fit measures involves comparing students’ observed partial
preference order (revealed by their ROL) with the predictions based on different sets
of identifying assumptions. We use two distinct measures: (i) the first is the mean
predicted probability of the observed ordering of students’ top two choices, which is
averaged across students; (ii) the second measure is the mean predicted probability of
the observed ordering of students’ full list of choices. Because of the type-I extreme
values, we can exactly calculate these probabilities. The results are reported in Panel B
of Table 6 in the main text.
Table D3: Goodness of Fit: Observed vs. Simulated Cutoffs
Cutoffs in simulated samples with estimates from
Observed
cutoffs
Weak
Truth-telling
Stability of the
matching
outcome
Stability and
undominated
strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School 2 0.015 0.004 0.024 0.019
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
School 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School 4 0.001 0.043 0.017 0.017
(0.015) (0.007) (0.008)
School 5 0.042 0.064 0.053 0.040
(0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
School 6 0.069 0.083 0.078 0.062
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
School 7 0.373 0.254 0.373 0.320
(0.020) (0.010) (0.012)
School 8 0.239 0.000 0.241 0.153
(0.001) (0.023) (0.047)
School 9 0.563 0.371 0.564 0.505
(0.033) (0.017) (0.023)
School 10 0.505 0.393 0.506 0.444
(0.029) (0.011) (0.014)
School 11 0.705 0.409 0.705 0.663
(0.040) (0.009) (0.013)
Notes: This table compares the cutoffs, observed for the 11 high schools of the Southern District of Paris in 2013, to the
average cutoffs simulated under various identifying assumptions as in Table 5. The reported values for the simulated cutoffs
are averaged over 300 simulated samples, and the standard deviations across the samples are reported in parentheses. In
all simulations, we vary only the utility shocks, which are kept common across columns 2–4.
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Appendix E Supplementary Figure and Table
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Figure E5: The Southern District of Paris for Public High School Admissions
Notes: The Southern District of Paris covers four of the city’s 20 arrondissements (administrative divisions): 5th, 6th,
13th and 14th. The large red circles show the location of the district’s 11 public high schools (lyce´es). The small blue
circles show the home addresses of the 1,590 students in the data.
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Table E4: Assigned and Unassigned Students in the Southern District of Paris
Sample
Assigned Unassigned
Panel A. Student characteristics
Age 15.0 15.0
Female 0.51 0.45
French score 0.56 0.45
Math score 0.54 0.47
Composite score 0.55 0.46
high SES 0.48 0.73
With low-income bonus 0.16 0.00
Panel B. Enrolment outcomes
Enrolled in assignment school 0.96
Enrolled in another public school 0.01 0.65
Enrolled in a private school 0.03 0.35
Number of students 1,568 22
Notes: The summary statistics reported in this table are based on administrative data from the Paris Education Authority
(Rectorat de Paris), for students who applied to the 11 high schools of Paris’s Southern District for the academic year
starting in 2013. All scores are from the exams of the Diploˆme national du brevet (DNB) in middle school and are measured
in percentiles and normalized to be in r0, 1s. Enrollment shares are computed for students who are still enrolled in the Paris
school system at the beginning of the 2013-2014 academic year (97 percent of the initial sample). Students unassigned
after the main round have the possibility of participating in a supplementary round, but with choices restricted to schools
with remaining seats.
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